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COMMENT
TORTS-A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF STRICT TORT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY IN NEW MEXICO.

INTRODUCTION*

The buyer of a defective product historically had only two theories
of liability available to him against a seller: negligence and breach of

warranty. Within the last decade, however, the courts of New Mexico
have recognized an alternative theory of liability which makes sellers
strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by defects in their products.

Many issues relating to the scope of liability created under this new

theory have been addressed by the courts during this brief period.
Many other issues, however, remain for judicial resolution. This Com-

ment examines the development in New Mexico of strict tort liability

as a theory of liability which may be relied upon in lieu of, or in
addition to, the theories of negligence and breach of warranty,1 and
places special emphasis upon those unsettled questions which are

most likely to be the subject of future litigation.

I. ADOPTION OF THE THEORY OF STRICT TORT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The judicial recognition of the public's right to recover from manufacturers and sellers of products for injuries caused by a condition
of a manufactured good was, until recently, a slow process. This was

due in part to the attitude of early nineteenth century courts that in-

fant industries should be protected from the crushing financial burden imposed by numerous personal injury judgments.2 This attitude
*The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Professors Joseph Goldberg
and Ted Occhialino of the University of New Mexico School of Law for the suggestions and
encouragement which they offered during the writing of this Comment.
1. The focus of this Comment is upon the doctrine of strict tort as a basis for imposing
liability on a seller of a defective product. No attempt is made to discuss negligence and
breach of warranty as alternative theories of products liability, although comparisons between strict tort and negligence and warranty will be made where relevant. All three theories
may be available to a plaintiff in a given products action. However, the considerations which
must be made in determining whether to plead a particular theory of liability are beyond
the scope of this Comment. Discussion purposely has been limited to actions sounding in
strict tort.
2. For a general discussion of the development of products liability law, see W. Prosser,
The Law of Torts § § 96-98 at 641-58 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]. See
also Maleson, Negligence is Dead But Its Doctrines Rule Us From the Grave: A Proposalto
Limit Defendants' Responsibility in Strict Products Liability Actions Without Resort to
Proximate Cause, 51 Temp. L.Q. 1, 6 (1978).
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resulted in the doctrine of caveat emptor, or "let the buyer beware,"
which applied absent fraud or an express agreement to the contrary
on the part of the seller.' Under this doctrine the duty to discover
shortcomings in a product prior to the consummation of a sale generally was imposed on the buyer. No recovery would lie against the
seller for damages caused by a defect which later manifested itself
unless the buyer could establish that the seller had intentionally deceived him in order to induce the sale, or that the seller had promised to indemnify him for any product flaw. In all other cases, the
4
buyer was presumed at law to have relied upon his own judgment.
In light of these restrictions it was very difficult for a consumer injured by a defective product to recover against a seller.
Social attitudes concerning who should bear the risk of loss created
by injury-producing products eventually changed, and courts began
to recognize exceptions to what could be perceived as a general rule
of a seller's non-liability. One important divergence from this rule
was the abolition of the requirement of privity, or a direct contractual
relation between buyer and seller, in product actions based on a negligence theory. The privity requirement in negligence actions arose
during the period in which the courts restricted consumers' rights to
recover against manufacturers.' The rationale for the requirement
was that, because the manufacturer could not foresee injury to anyone other than his immediate purchaser, he should not be liable for
6
injuries to the remote user of his product. This view became untenable, however, once it was admitted that it is entirely foreseeable
that a manufacturer's immediate purchaser, normally a wholesaler or
retailer, will resell his product and that a defect capable of injuring
the initial purchaser poses the same risk of injury to the ultimate
consumer. 7 The New Mexico Supreme Court approved this modern
view in 1968 and abolished the requirement of privity in negligence
actions. 8 When this requirement is abolished, the manufacturer becomes liable in negligence to all reasonably foreseeable users, includ3. Prosser, supra note 2, § 96, at 641-42. See also W. Story, A Treatise on the Law of
Sales of Personal Property 423-24 (3d ed. 1862).
4. See 63 Am. Jur. 2dProductsLiability § 113 (1972).
5. The requirement of privity in negligence actions was derived from the early English
case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). For a discussion
of the requirement and its rationale, see 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability
§ 5.01 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman]. See also Steinberg v. Coda
Roberson Constr. Co., 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968), in which the court discusses
Winterbottom.
6. See 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 5.01; Prosser, supra note 2, § 96, at
641-42.
7. 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 5.01.
8. See Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr. Co., 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968).
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ing the purchaser himself, members of his family, a borrower from
the purchaser, second-hand purchaser, and donees of the purchaser. 9
In addition to expanding liability under negligence theories, courts
also began to liberalize notions of a seller's responsibility under
a
theory of breach of warranty. Nineteenth century courts already
had
recognized that a seller could be held liable to his buyer where
he
had represented that a product was of a certain quality, and
that he
would guarantee this quality by indemnifying the buyer for any
loss
caused by the product's failure to live up to the representation. 1
0 It
was not until 1938, however, that a court ruled that a seller could
be
held liable for an innocent breach of an express representation
without further proof that the seller had also promised to indemnify
the
buyer for his losses.' ' Thus, the seller of an automobile whose
literature advertised that a car's windshield was "shatterproof' could
be
held liable for breach of an express warranty where the car's buyer
was injured when a pebble shattered the window.' 2
Consumers were given expanded protection under a warranty
theory with the judicial recognition of "implied" warranties, promises by a seller which arise as a matter of law. The concept of implied
warranties was first applied in cases involving the sale of defective
or
unhealthy food and drink,' I with the courts treating sellers of
such
goods as implicitly promising that their goods were safe for consumption. Implied warranties of safety later were applied generally to
all
manufactured goods. In a leading case, for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that both the manufacturer and dealer
of an
automobile impliedly warrants its safety to the vehicle's user.' '
The primary difference between negligence and warranty theories
is that in warranty the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant
failed to exercise "due care." The focus is placed on the condition
of
the product, not upon the conduct of the defendant.' ' Because,
under warranty theory, the supplier of goods can be held liable
even
though he has exercised all reasonable care, his responsibility to
the
consumer becomes one of "strict liability" for injuries caused by
defective goods.' 6
9. 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 5.03[11 [c].
10. See Seixas v. Woods, II Cai R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
11. See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, affl'dper
curiam on rehearing, 168 Wash. 456, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), affd on second appeal,
179 Wash. 123, 35
P.2d 1090 (1934).
12. Id.
13. See Prosser, supra note 2, § 97, at 653-54.
14. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960).
15. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 16.01[1]
(1981) [hereinafter
cited as 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman].
16. Prosser, supra note 2, § 97, at 650-56.
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These two theories of liability, while significantly eroding a seller's
insulation from liability in product liability actions, nevertheless
came to be viewed as inadequate to protect consumers. Negligence
theory suffers from the substantial burden of requiring proof that
the defendant failed to exercise due care at some stage in his handling
of a product.' Actions for breach of warranty, given the willingness

of many courts to treat them as contract actions,' 8 were limited first9

by the requirement of a contractual relation between the parties'
and later by the availability of numerous technical defenses to liabiland the requireity, such as disclaimers contained in the sales contract
2
0
breach.
any
of
seller
the
to
notice
ment of timely
The shortcomings of these two theories became apparent as courts
struggled to find a theory of liability which would "insure that the
the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by

manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than 2by

the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." "1
What these courts sought was a theory of recovery which would comthe
2
bine the best attributes of the earlier product liability theories;
2
warranty.
of
liability
strict
the
broad reach of negligence and
The resulting theory, first formulated by the Supreme Court of
California in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,

Inc.,2 3 was that of strict tort liability. Under this theory manufac-

turers were liable for injuries caused by defects in their products
without regard to the exercise of due care or the existence of privity
between the parties. The theory's popularity soon grew to such an

extent that the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts drafted
a section on the strict liability of sellers of defective products for in-

17. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 731, 497 P.2d 732, 733 (1972).
18. See Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972);Vitro Corp. of Amer84
ica v. Texas Vitrified Supply Co., 71 N.M. 95, 376 P.2d 41 (1962); Steadman v. Turner,
whether
N.M. 738, 507 P.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1973). There has been an historical debate as to
liabilbreach of warranty is more properly regarded as a theory of tort rather than contract
conduct
ity, since the obligation imposed in breach of warranty actions arises from a seller's
sound in
and not from any agreement. The majority view, however, is that warranty actions
contract. For a discussion of the problem, see Prosser, supra note 2, § 95, at 634-35.
a war19. While contractual provity at one time was required between the litigants in
squarely
ranty action, many courts later abolished the requirement. The issue has never been
Stang v. Hertz
addressed in New Mexico, but there is dictum from the court's opinion in
as a requirecontract
of
privity
that
(1972),
733
732,
P.2d
497
731,
Corp., 83 N.M. 730,
ment in warranty actions also has been abolished in this jurisdiction.
20. Id.
377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
21. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, -,
(1962).
700
697,
Rptr.
Cal.
22. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 731, 497 P.2d 732, 733 (1972).
23. 59 Cal 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
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jury to users or consumers. 2
vides:

4

Section 402A of the Restatement pro-

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

This statement of a seller's strict liability in tort was adopted by
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Stang v. Hertz,2" decided in 1972.
The court did so after noting both the inadequacies of negligence and
warranty theories and the substantial policy considerations favoring
placement of liability on the party primarily responsible for the injuries caused by a defective product. With the adoption of Section
402A and the recognition of a seller's strict liability for injuries
caused by a defective condition of his product, New Mexico joined
the majority of jurisdictions, which recognize some form of strict

tort products liability.2 6

II. THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY AND PROTECTION

A. Parties

The adoption of the doctrine of strict tort liability raises two initial

questions: first, who will be subject to liability under the new rule of
24. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) [herinafter cited as Restatement].
25. 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972). Although Section 402A had been either discussed or applied in three New Mexico cases prior to Stang, it was not until Stang that the
Restatement's rule of strict tort liability was relied upon by the Supreme Court itself to
hold a defendant strictly liable in tort. See Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d
1184 (10th Cir. 1970); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller Metal Co., 83 N.M. 516, 494
P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1971); Schrib v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (Ct. App.
1969). It also should be noted that the court in Stang did not, in so many words, formally
adopt Section 402A. In the very next products liability action to come before the court,
however, it was made clear that the effect of the court's opinion in Stang was to adopt Section 402A as the law in New Mexico. See Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 17, 498 P.2d
1359, 1360 (1972).
26. For a compilation of the jurisdictions which have recognized strict tort products liability by case law or by statute, see 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 15, § 16A[3],
n. 2.
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law; second, who will be entitled to its benefits. Neither question has
been fully answered by the New Mexico courts. The cases indicate,
however, that the doctrine will be interpreted broadly to further the
public policy of affording maximum protection to consumers.

1. Defendants
Strict tort liability applies generally to "sellers" of defective products. Section 402A itself imposes liability on "one who sells" defec-

tive products, but limits the term "seller" to those individuals who
2

are "engaged in the business of selling" the product in question.
2
Comment f to Section 402A 8 explains that the rule therefore does
not apply to "the occasional seller" or "the ordinary individual who
makes the isolated sale," 2 9 as in the case of an individual who sells,
on one occasion, his used car or joins with his neighbors to hold a

garage sale.

0

A defendant in a strict tort action need not, however,

have been engaged solely in the business of marketing the injurycausing product. Liability still may be imposed as long as the product
was sold as part of, and in the normal and regular scope of, the defendant's business. ' Those subject to the rule therefore will include
27. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A(1)(a).
28. The Comments to Section 402A, drafted by the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, have been applied generally by the courts of New Mexico and therefore will
be relied upon throughout this article to explain and illustrate the doctrine of strict tort
liability. While litigants should not assume that the courts will defer to the wisdom of the
Comments in every instance, nevertheless, decided cases establish that they are persuasive
authority for determining the proper application of Section 402A. For examples of the special reliance which the New Mexico courts have placed upon the Comments, see Rudisaile
v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d 175 (1979); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90
N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Richards v. The Upjohn Co., 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 516 (Ct.
App. June 5, 1980), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980);Tenneyv. Seven-Up
Co., 92 N.M. 158, 584 P.2d 205 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978);
Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540 P.2d 249 (1975); First Nat'l Bank inAlbuquerquev. Nor-Am
Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536
P.2d 1085 (1975); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974); Shrib v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458
P.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1969).
29. This restriction on the scope of strict tort liability under Section 402A is analogous
to the requirement under § 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 552-314 (1978), that a seller of goods must be a "merchant" with respect to such goods before
a warranty of merchantability will be implied from a contract for their sale.
30. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Commentf
31. Id. A problem created by the view expressed in Comment f is that strict tort liability
does not apply to the "occasional seller" is that the phrase is not defined, and the limits to
liability thereby imposed are unclear. This problem may be illustrated by the example of a
sales company that purchases a fleet of automobiles each year for its employees and then
resells them at year's end. Comment f provides little guidance in this set of circumstances as
to whether strict tort liability may be imposed on the company in favor of a subsequent
purchaser. An argument can be made that liability should be imposed in cases such as these
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manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and distributors of goods, 3 2 as
well as individuals regularly selling a product incident to a larger
enterprise, as where the owner of a motion picture theatre sells pop3
corn to his patrons. 3
These principles are illustrated by a New Mexico case, Lay v. Vip's
Big Boy Restaurant, Inc. "' In Lay, a customer sought to have a restaurant held strictly liable under Section 402A for injuries sustained
when a window shattered and blew onto the plaintiff while he was
dining. The court ruled that under these facts the restaurant could
not be held liable in strict tort. The court implied that if such liability were available at all it would be as against some other entity not
a party to the action, presumably the window's manufacturer. While
the court did not elaborate on the basis for its holding, it seems clear
that it was unwilling to find that the defendant had "sold" the window to the plaintiff. To hold the defendant liable, the court would
have had to treat it as the seller of a safe place in which to dine. The
logical extension of this view is that the defendant would be required
to insure the safety of its entire premises, such as its parking lot.
Strict tort liability has never been extended this far. The restaurant
was the seller of food. While it could be held liable under Section
402A for any defect in that food, and even for a defect in the container in which the food was sold,3" it could not be held liable under
a theory of strict tort liability for the environmental safety of its
place of business. The fact that no defective product had been sold
to the plaintiff precluded the imposition of strict tort liability. 6
only where the defendant intended to regularly profit from his resale of the goods. The endeavor then would be a true business undertaking involving the marketing of a product, a
venture to which Section 402A was intended to apply. For a discussion of Commentfand
its application to "occasional seller" fact patterns, see Brescia v. Great Road Realty Trust,
117 N.H. 154, 373 A.2d 1310(1977).
32. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Commentf
33. Id.
34. 89 N.M. 155, 548 P.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1976).

35. As, for example, the cup into which coffee is poured. See Restatement, supra note
24, § 402A, Comment h.
36. This principle is further illustrated by the case of Ligocky v. Wilcox,
-N.M.
-

620 P.2d 1300 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,

-N.M.

-,

622 P.2d 1046 (1980).

In Ligocky, the owner of cotton and mio fields purchased an herbicide containing 2-4D,
an inherently dangerous chemical. The owner then employed a pilot.to aerially spray the
herbicide on the owner's fields. Unfortunately, winds caused some of the herbicide to drift
onto adjoining land belonging to the plaintiff, causing damage to the land. The plaintiff
brought suit against the owner of the cotton and milo fields, the pilot, and the manufacturer
of the herbicide. The owner in turn cross-claimed against the pilot on what the court of appeals interpreted as a theory of strict tort liability. It was this cross-claim which was the subject of appeal following judgment by the trial court in favor of the owner. In its opinion, the
court of appeals invoked conclusory analysis similar to that in Lay to find that strict tort liability had no application under the facts of the case. The obvious explanation for the court's
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Two questions affecting the class of sellers who are subject to
strict tort liability left unresolved by Section 402A are whether strict
tort liability extends to (1) the seller of a product expected to be
processed or otherwise substantially changed before it reaches the
user or consumer, and (2) the seller of a component part of a product
to be assembled. 3 The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed
these issues in First National Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. 38 After analyzing the comments to Section
402A, the court held that only under limited circumstances will
these sellers be relieved from strict tort liability.
In Nor-Am, the manufacturer of a liquid seed disinfectant containing mercury sold, through its distributor, a quantity of the highly
toxic substance to a grain company. The disinfectant was to be used
by the company in treating seed grain to prevent the growth of
fungus and other diseases. While the grain was being treated, a residue
of the treated grain collected on the floor of the treating area, where
it was then bagged in unmarked sacks by company employees and
placed in a storage area belonging to the company. One of the plaintiffs went to the company to buy grain to feed hogs which he raised
as a sideline. After purchasing some grain, he was given, free of
charge, a quantity of the treated grain, which he then used to fatten
a hog. Seven weeks later, the hog was butchered and the family consumed its meat over the next few months. As a result of eating this
meat, the plaintiffs children were stricken with organic mercury
poisoning which caused permanent damage to their central nervous
systems. Relying in part upon a theory of strict tort liability, an
action was brought against the grain company, the distributor, and
the manufacturer of the disinfectant.
Following summary judgment in favor of the distributor and manufacturer in the lower court, the court of appeals considered whether
holding is that the pilot had not created the risk of injury to the plaintiff by having marketed
a defective product, but only in his use of the product. The policy justifications for shifting
the burden of injuries caused by defective products from injured consumers to those who
market the product and who are able to treat the burden as a cost of production simply
were not present in Ligocky. Strict tort liability extends only to those who market a defective product for use by others, and not to those whose actual use of a defective product results in injury to others.
37. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Caveats (2) and (3). The drafter's decision
not to take any position concerning the circumstances contemplated by these caveats was
based upon a lack of sufficient number of judicial opinions, at the time Section 402A was
first drafted, indicating the proper scope of liability. See id. § 402A, Comments p and q.
38. 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085
(1975).
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the judgment could be supported on the basis that the product had
undergone substantial change at the hands of the grain company or
was a component part, thereby giving rise to an immunity from strict
tort liability. The court concluded that it could not. Without answering the question of whether the seller of a product expected to be
substantially changed is relieved from strict tort liability, the court
found initially that the disinfectant itself had not undergone any
change but merely had been sprayed on the grain. Under the court's
view it was more accurate to think of the disinfectant as a component
part of the treated grain. The court then invoked Comment q to Section 402A to the effect that where, as in the case before it, there has
been no change in the component part itself when added onto the
finished product, the seller of the component part is not relieved
from strict liability.
The rule derived from Nor-Am is that the seller of a product expected to be further processed or substantially changed may be relieved from strict tort liability only where the product itself has
undergone processing or substantial modification, such that the prod39
uct, as originally sold, was not in a final or remotely usable state.
For example, the seller of pig-iron, which can be used for a variety of
purposes, would not be held strictly liable under Section 402A if this
raw material were processed by another manufacturer and made into
the frame of a commuter bus which later developed cracks. 4 0 A similar rule will apply with respect to the liability of a seller of component parts. He may be relieved from liability only where the product
itself was changed when added onto the finished good. 4 1 The seller
of a gauge for the instrument panel of an automobile could therefore
expect to avoid liability for injuries caused by the malfunctioning of
the gauge where he could show that the builder of the car created the
defect by improperly installing the gauge. 4 2
Ultimately, Nor-Am must be viewed as standing for the proposition
that a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for injuries caused by
a defect in a finished product where the original product already was
in a defective but usable state prior to further processing, even though
he expected, for example, that his retailer would inspect, adjust, or
39. Id. at 86, 537 P.2d at 694 (citing Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 764 (E.D.
Pa. 1971)).
40. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment p.
41. First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 86,
537 P.2d 682, 694 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975) (citing
Symons v. Mueller Co., 493 F.2d 972 (10th Cit. 1974);Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r & Supply
Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969)).
42. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment q.
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4
otherwise modify the product to correct the defect prior to sale. 1
The problem for the manufacturer and distributor in Nor-Am was
that their product always would pose a risk of substantial injury in
the absence of an adequate warning informing users of the danger in
ingesting their product, even though the product could still be used
for its intended purposes. The converse of this principle is that where
a product was not "defective" within the meaning of Section 402A
before it was processed or incorporated into another product, no liability will attach to the original seller for defects appearing in the
finished product. 4 4
To conclude, Nor-Am clearly establishes that the fact that a product is to undergo further processing or is to be incorporated as a
component part of another product does not necessarily provide a
basis for immunity from strict liability. Manufacturers of such products are included in the class of sellers subject to liability under Section 402A in New Mexico.

2. Plaintiffs
Both the Comments to Section 402A and the case law in New
Mexico demonstrate that the class of individuals protected by the
doctrine of strict tort liability is sizable. Section 402A provides that
this class includes all ultimate users or consumers of a defective product. Given the underlying purposes of the doctrine of strict tort liability, the Restatement's "user or consumer" language should be
given an expanded interpretation.
This interpretation is further warranted by the Restatement's elimination of privity of contract as a separate requirement in strict tort
43. This statement of the rule comports generally with the views expressed by other
courts addressing the issue. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d
168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (manufacturer of automobile with defective master brake
cylinder could not escape strict liability by claiming that its dealer had a duty to make final
inspection, correction and adjustment of brakes); Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App.
2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964) (manufacturer of defective blades for a concrete cutting
machine could not avoid strict liability by claiming that retailer of machine had a duty to
install a safety device on the blade).
44. Accord, Verge v. Ford Motor Co., [1978-79 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep.
8255 (3d Cir. 1978) (manufacturer of truck cab and chassis unit capable of being
(CCH)
converted for many uses could not be held strictly liable where truck had been converted by
third party for purpose of garbage collection and original truck failed to incorporate warning buzzer necessary for safe operation of garbage trucks); Largo v. Midland Coops., Inc.
8552 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (manufac[1978-79 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
turer of safe component part ultimately incorporated into a defective product cannot be
held strictly liable in tort). This statement of the holding in Nor-Am should be subject, however, to the limitation suggested in Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 84 N.M. 796, 508 P.2d
1283 (1973), that the seller of an otherwise non-defective product expected to be further
processed or incorporated into another product may still be held strictly liable in tort where
the seller has reason to anticipate that such further change will result in a defective product.
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actions, thereby exposing sellers of defective goods to liability to remote parties. As a Comment to Section 402A states, "it is not necessary that the ultimate user or consumer have acquired the product
directly from the seller" before strict liability may be imposed. 4 5
Nor will it be necessary for the consumer to have purchased the product at all. 4 6 The class of individuals protected under Section 402A in
New Mexico therefore has included a mechanic who worked in an
automotive shop where a compressor tank exploded, 47 a pilot of an
airplane which had been rented to him without oil in its engine, 4 8 a
participant in a city supervised recreational program who was injured
when a volleyball net standard fell on her foot, 4 9 and children who
had ingested the meat of a hog fed chemically treated seed originally
given to their father.' 0
The Comments to Section 402A further provide that strict tort liability is broad enough to cover "not only those who in fact consume
the product, but also those who prepare it for consumption," as in
the case of a bartender who opens a defective bottle of spirits for a
customer.' ' It also will protect those who are merely "passively enjoying the benefit of the product... as well as those who are utilizing
it for the purpose of doing work upon it."' 2 Section 402A therefore
has been relied upon successfully in New Mexico by a passenger in a
defective automobile leased by another,' ' and by a workman installing a defective metal tooth on a dirt scoop.5 4
One issue still to be addressed by the courts of New Mexico is
whether the doctrine of strict tort liability is broad enough to protect
a bystander who is injured by another individual's use of a defective
product, as where the occupants of a car are injured in a rear-end
collision caused by a truck manufactured with a defective braking
system. 5 ' A Caveat to Section 402A states that the authors of the
Restatement express no opinion as to whether strict tort liability applies "to harm to persons other than users or consumers.''5 6 Al45. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment I.
46. Id.
47. See Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank & Equip. Co., 93 N.M. 685, 604 P.2d 823 (Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).
48. See Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d 175 (1979).
49. See Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, __
N.M.
-,618 P.2d 1230 (1980).
50. See First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M.
74, 537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975).
51. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment!.
52. Id.
53. See Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
54. See Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1970).
55. See Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
56. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Caveat (1).
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though Comment o to Section 402A concludes that "there may be
no essential reason why such plaintiffs should not be brought within
the scope of the protection afforded," the authors of the Restatement took no position on the issue, and the New Mexico courts have
not yet had an opportunity to settle the matter in this jurisdiction.
The majority rule that has emerged following the initial drafting of
Section 402A is that third-party bystanders are entitled to recover
s
This rule is subject to the
under a theory of strict tort liability.'
to
limitation expressed by some courts that the seller is liable only 18
foreseeable.
those bystanders whose injuries were reasonably
Other courts have taken a contrary view, holding simply that bystanders, by definition, are not users or consumers and therefore cans
not benefit from the rule in Section 402A. 9
While it is not certain at this time which position will be adopted
by the New Mexico courts, it may be noted that the avowed purpose
in adopting strict tort liability in New Mexico was "to promote safety
by placing liability on the party primarily responsible for the injury
occurring."" It isentirely consistent with this purpose to permit bystanders to rely upon a theory of strict tort liability to the same
degree as is permitted users or consumers. At least where it is reasonably foreseeable that a defect in a product could cause injury to bystanders as well as to the product's users, recognition of a bystander's
right to recover in strict tort both promotes product safety and
places liability on the party primarily responsible for putting the
6
product into the stream of commerce.
B. Transactions
Although Section 402A speaks of the liability of a "seller" of a defective "product," the doctrine of strict tort liability has been con4210; Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 415 (1979).
57. See [1979] 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
App. 3d 121, 373 N.E.2d 1063 (1978);Gilbert v.
58. See Barr v. Rivinius, Inc., 58 IlL.
Stone City Constr. Co., Inc., 357 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. App. 1976).
59. See Spellmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Corp., 14 Wash. App. 642, 544 P.2d 107 (1975).
60. Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 576, 592 P.2d 175, 176 (1979).
Accord, Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1977).
61. This conclusion is supported by the recently adopted N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 14.2 (Repl.
1980), and the Committee Comments thereto, describing the duty of a "supplier." The instruction states that "[t] he supplier of a product has a duty to use ordinary care to avoid a
foreseeable risk of injury ... to persons who can be expected to be in the vicinity during
the use of the product." While the instruction primarily is intended for use in negligence
actions, the Committee Comment to U.J.I. 14.2 notes the following:
The duty is owed to all who may be foreseeably endangered by a failure to
exercise ordinary care,... including a bystander who is not the user of the
product. While § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts originally took
a neutral position towards application of strict liability to persons other than
users, the decided trend of the cases adopting the doctrine has been toward
inclusion of bystanders (citation omitted).
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strued to apply to consumer transactions not expressly contemplated
by Section 402A. Thus, as a general rule, strict tort liability need not
be confined to transactions involving the commercial sale of a product as such. The policies underlying the imposition of liability on
sellers of defective goods also may justify the liability of non-sellers
and sellers of intangible goods.
Stang v. Hertz6 2 illustrates how Section 402A may be applied to
non-sales transactions. In Stang, the supreme court ruled that the
lessor of a defective automobile could be held strictly liable in tort
for injuries caused by the defect to the occupants of the car. In its
analysis, the court found that the relationship of a bailor to bailed
goods was analogous to that of a seller to manufactured goods. 6 3 In
both cases a product has been placed in the stream of commerce for
use by consumers. The public policy which supports the liability of
the manufacturer, that of placing the burden of injuries caused by a
product upon those who market them, also supports the liability of
the lessor. Consequently, lessors of defective goods are as strictly
liable in tort as manufacturers or retailers of similar goods.
One application of Section 402A which has received only limited
approval by courts in other jurisdictions is the extension of strict
tort liability to persons rendering a service resulting in injury to another. There are two contexts in which this application may arise.
The first involves "pure" service transactions where the defendant is
alleged to have rendered a "defective" service, as where an architectural firm prepared all of the plans and specifications for the construction of a school building whose roof subsequently leaked. 64
The plaintiff in such an action seeks to have the firm held strictly
liable for its "failure to achieve successfully the result expected by
the consumer," 6 s in this case, the construction of a roof which does
not leak. The second context in which service liability is sought to
be imposed involves "hybrid sales/service" transactions. 6 6 In these
cases both a product and product-related services have been sold. An
example would be where a building contractor agrees, as part of a re62. 83 N.M. 730, 497 P. 2d 732 (1972).
63. For this analysis, the court relied upon several cases arising in other jurisdictions.
See Bachner v. Pearson, 469 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental
Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car, Corp.,
52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45
N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
64. See Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v. Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc. 2d 804, 398
N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
65. Ware, Strict Liability for Defects in Consumer Services: A Defense Approach, 20
For the Defense 3,5 (1979).
66. See id.; Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions:A Policy Approach, 28 Sw.
L.J. 575 (1974).
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modeling job, to attach some household appliances to an existing gas
system and in the process installs defective fittings which permit gas
6
While
to escape; the gas later ignites and the house is destroyed.
in
liability
tort
strict
the courts have had less difficulty in applying
the
in
found
been
not
has
this latter context, liability generally

former.
The majority rule is that strict tort liability does not apply to persons rendering either professional or non-professional services which
6
Strict tort liability therefore
do not involve the sale of a product.
who used a defective
dentist
a
has been held unavailable as against
6
company which
engineering
9
an
needle to administer an anesthetic,
operation of a
initial
and
construction
designed and supervised the
7
0 and the redust,
cancer-causing
produced
which
chemical plant
7
given varhave
courts
The
1
exploded.
later
pairer of a boiler which

ious rationales for this denial of liability: the person who renders services is not an insurer of the results of his services; at least in the case
of professional services, the usefulness of the service outweighs any

need for imposing strict tort liability; and extending strict tort liabil7

ity inevitably would increase the already high price of services.

2

The most common justification provided by the courts for this rule,
however, is that, because no sale of goods is involved in the sale of

7
While this conclusory
services, strict tort liability is not available.
reasoning has been criticized as taking a narrow view of strict tort
74

the doctrine
liability which fails to consider modern applications of

the majority of courts continue to reject attempts to extend strict
tort liability to pure service transactions.
Hybrid sales/service transactions have been treated differently, with

several courts holding that strict tort liability is available to injured
67. See Warrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971).
68. See Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties
and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 661. There have been only a few cases involving pure service transactions in which a defendant's strict liability was recognized. See
Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Reliable Elec. Co.
v. Clinton Campbell Contractor, Inc., 10 Ariz. App. 371, 459 P.2d 98 (1969); Buckeye
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972);
Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974).
69. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd sub nom.
Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1978), affl'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d
129 (1969).
70. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
71. See Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833 (Alaska
1967).
72. See Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties
and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 661.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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consumers in this context. This result may be explained on the basis
that in such cases the injury ordinarily is caused by a defect in the
product transferred to the consumer, rather than by a defect in the
service. It is the sale of the defective product which gives rise to liability and not the rendering of the service. Thus, a beauty parlor operator can be held strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by a defective permanent wave solution regardless of whether the method used
7
In one recent Minnesota case,
to apply the solution was faulty.
of an otherwise noninstallation
however, involving the improper
from the defenplaintiffs
the
by
defective floor furnace purchased
the basis that
on
apparently
dant, strict tort liability was imposed,
7 6 The case represents
service.
defective
a
the defendant had rendered
a liberal application of the doctrine of strict tort liability in the context of hybrid sales/service transactions in that it holds a servicer
strictly liable where his work on a product itself has created the risk
of injury to consumers. The precedential value of this case at this
time is unclear; it has not been cited or discussed by any other court.
doctrine of
The only case in New Mexico to consider whether the
a service" 7
of
provider
the
to
extended
be
may
strict tort liability
appears to hold that, at least in the context of pure service transac78
tions, the doctrine has no application. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton,
a wrongful death action was brought against an oil company, a lessee
of that company's gas station and the lessee's employee to recover
for the death of plaintiff's wife, who died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The accident occurred a short time
after the lessee's employee had worked on the brakes of the decedent's car. The immediate cause of the accident was brake failure
aggravated by one of the car's tires having fallen off. The plaintiff
75. See Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
76. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977).
77. The issue of strict tort liability in service transactions was raised in one other New
Mexico case, but the plaintiff's allegation of service liability was dismissed without discussion by the court. In Lay v. Vip's Big Boy Restaurant, Inc., 89 N.M. 155, 548 P.2d 117 (Ct.
App. 1976), a customer in a restaurant sought to hold the restaurant's owner strictly liable
in tort for injuries sustained when a window shattered and blew onto the plaintiff while
dining. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that there had been a "product sale, combined with
a service." The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, concluding that if strict tort liability
was available at all it would be as against some other defendant, presumably the window's
manufacturer. The case does not present the typical service transaction in which strict tort
liability normally is sought. There was no expending of labor paid for by the customer
which caused his injuries. It therefore is understandable that the court in Lay chose not to
adopt the plaintiff's framing of the issues but analyzed the problem instead in terms of an
injury caused by a defective product placed on the market by some individual other than
the restaurant owner.
78. 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973).
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alleged that the lessee and his employee were liable for negligence,
and that their negligence could be imputed to the lessor. Strict
tort
liability was not alleged in the complaint. The court of appeals ruled,
however, that the lessor oil company could be held strictly liable
for
its lessee's negligent servicing of the decedent's vehicle where such
repair had rendered the vehicle "unreasonably dangerous" within
the
meaning of Section 402A.7 9 The supreme court reversed the decision
of the court of appeals, rejecting what it viewed as an attempt
to
broaden the doctrine of strict tort liability beyond its intended scope.
Unfortunately, the basis for the court's holding was not clearly articulated. The court stated simply that "[nothing] we said in our decision in [Stang v. Hertz] can properly be enlarged or extended to
embrace the factual situation here." 8"0 It seems clear, however, that
the
effect of the court's opinion is to express approval of the majority
rule that strict tort liability may not be imposed in actions involving
a pure service transaction. The facts of the case are virtually identical
to those relied upon in the formulation of the majority rule.8 I
What remains unclear in New Mexico is whether strict tort liability
is available in actions involving hybrid sales/service transactions. 8 2
The court's opinion in Chevron does not address this issue, and
no
prediction reasonably can be made based upon the court's comments.
C Compensable Injuries
1. Injury to the person
Plaintiffs in strict tort actions are entitled to recover damages for
personal injuries caused by a defective product.8 Because physical
injury to an individual often results in substantial out-of-pocket
and
future expenses, it is not surprising that actions for damages due
to
personal injuries have dominated the case law in New Mexico.8 4
No
79. See Sutton v. Chevron Oil Co., 85 N.M. 604, 514 P.2d 1301
(Ct. App.), rev'd, 85
N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973).
80. Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 85 N.M. 679, 681, 515 P.2d 1283,
1285 (1973).
81. See Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co.,
427 P.2d 833 (Alaska
1967) (repairer of boiler which later exploded held not liable
under doctrine of strict tort
liability).
82 The case of Lay v. Vip's Big Boy Restaurant, Inc., 89 N.M.
155, 548 P.2d 117 (Ct.
App. 1976), does not resolve this issue. See discussion at note 77,
supra.
83. See Restatment, supra note 24, § 402A(1); Prosser, supra note
2, § 101, at 665-67.
84. See Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir.
Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1973); Moomey 1978); Madrid v. Mine
v. Massey Ferguson, Inc.,
429 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1970); Bassham v. Owens-Corning
Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F.
Supp. 1007 (D.N.M. 1971); Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola,
-. N.M.
-, 618 P.2d
1230 (1980); Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575,
592 P.2d 175 (1979); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Stang
v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M.
730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M.
16, 498 P.2d 1359 (1972);
Richards v. The Upjohn Co., 19 N.M. St B. Bull. 516 (Ct. App.
June 5, 1980), cert. denied,
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New Mexico court as yet has delineated the types of personal injuries

which are compensable in an action for strict tort liability. It is clear,
however, that plaintiffs are entitled to recover for wrongful death.' s

Recovery undoubtedly also will be permitted for such items as medical payments, loss of earning ability, and pain and suffering, losses
which traditionally have been compensable in New Mexico in actions

for personal injuries.' '
An interesting question which has been raised recently in other
jurisdictions is whether recovery should be allowed in a strict tort liability action for emotional distress or mental anguish.' ' The party
seeking recovery for this type of injury typically is a bystander, the
classic example being the mother who sees her child struck by an
automobile. Where the cause of the accident was the driver's negliCalifornia
gence, many courts now follow the rule established by the
8 and would
Legg,
v.
Dillon
of
Supreme Court in the landmark case
permit the mother to recover for emotional trauma caused by having
witnessed the accident.' 9 New Mexico courts have never disapproved
of the Dillon rule, but have held merely that recovery will not be pershock or distress
mitted where there is no proof that the emotional
9
Few courts have
bystander.
the
to
caused actual physical injury
the accident
where
recover
should
considered whether the bystander
driver's negthe
than
rather
automobile
the
was caused by a defect in
the mental
where
that
however,
held,
has
ligence. At least one court
injuries,
physical
in
resulted
another
distress of witnessing injury to
9 1
recovery should be permitted.
Mexico was
An opportunity for discussion of these issues in 9New
2 However, the
Co.
Seven-Up
v.
Tenney
of
presented by the case
94 N.M. 459, 612 P.2d
94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980); Strickland v. Roosevelt County,
685, 604 P.2d 823
N.M.
93
Co.,
Equip.
&
Tank
Kohlhaas
v.
689 (Ct. App. 1980); Grammer
Bank in AlbuNat'l
First
(1980);
545
P.2d
614
628,
(Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 94 N.M.
682 (Ct. App.), cert.
querque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d
86 N.M. 763, 527
denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp.,
(1974).
1232
P.2d
529
111,
N.M.
87
denied,
cert.
App.),
P.2d 1075 (Ct.
175 (1979); Stang v.
85. See Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d
County, 94 N.M.
Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Strickland v. Roosevelt
459, 612 P.2d 689 (Ct App. 1980).
68
86. See Jones v. Pollock, 72 N.M. 315, 383 P.2d 271 (1963); Baros v. Kazmierczwk,
(1961).
N.M. 421, 362 P.2d 798
Extension of
87. For a full discussion of this issue, see Joseph, Dillon's Other Leg: The
and Physical Injurthe Doctrine Which Permits Bystander Recovery for Emotional Trauma
ies to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 18 Duquesne L. Rev. 1 (1979).
88. 68 Cal 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
89. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970).
1971).
90. See Aragon v. Speelman, 83 N.M. 285, 491 P.2d 173 (Ct. App.
612 (1977).
91. See Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr.
585 P.2d 324
180,
N.M.
92
denied,
cert.
App.),
(Ct.
205
P.2d
584
92. 92 N.M. 158,
(1978).
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question of whether mental anguish is compensable in strict tort liability actions was never reached. In Tenney, the mother of a fivemonth old child experienced anxiety and stomach cramps after learning that a bottle of soda pop, a portion of which she had given to her
child, contained blood vessels. An action for strict tort liability was
brought against the bottler, and judgment was entered in the plaintiffs favor. On appeal, however, the court held that the defendant
could not be held strictly liable in tort because the product was not
"unreasonably dangerous" within the meaning of,
and as required by,
Section 402A. To support this holding the court relied upon uncontradicted evidence that the foreign substance in the bottle was "harmless." The court's disposition of the case thereby avoided the question
of whether the plaintiff's anxiety and stomach cramps, which the
court described as "normal reactions," were compensable in a strict
tort action. The question of whether emotional trauma is compensable in strict tort actions therefore remains undecided in New Mex93
ico.
2. Injury to property
Section 402A declares that the seller of a defective product will be
liable not only for physical harm thereby inflicted upon a user, but
also for harm to his property other than the defective product. 9 '
Moreover, New Mexico case law establishes that the user himself need
not have suffered any personal injury in order to recover for injury
to his property. 9 s Thus, it is possible to maintain an action for strict
tort liability where, for example, a defective floor furnace causes a
home to be destroyed by fire while its owners are absent, 9 6 and
93. A reasonable argument can be made that the right to recover for emotional
distress
ultimately does not depend upon whether the plaintiff's action is one for strict
tort liability
or negligence. The question really is one of policy, and concerns whether this
type of injury
should ever be compensable, given its remoteness from the initial injury to the
other person.
To the extent that such injuries are deemed by the courts reasonably foreseeable
under negligence theory, recovery should also be permitted in strict tort liability actions.
94. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A(l). That section only contemplates
injury
to a consumer's property other than the defective product, and does not address
the question of whether direct injury to the product by reason of its defective condition
also is compensable under strict tort liability, is supported by both judicial and scholarly
interpretations of the Restatement See [1980] 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
4220; Note, Economic
Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of Judicial Confusion Between
Contractand
Tort, 54 Notre Dame Law. 118 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as Note].
95. See Standhart v. Flintkote Co., 84 N.M. 796, 508 P.2d 1283 (1973); Springer
Corp.
v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., Inc., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846 (Ct. App.
1976), cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller
Metal Co.,
83 N.M. 516, 494 P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1971).
96. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller Metal Co., 83 N.M. 516, 494 P.2d
178 (Ct.
App. 1971).
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where a defective tire causes an accident resulting in physical damage
to the vehicle on which the tire was mounted but no personal injury
to the vehicle's driver.9 '
A question which has not been addressed in New Mexico is whether
the property of a consumer entitled to protection under the doctrine
of strict tort liability should include a defective product itself. Can
the buyer of a new mobile home, for example, which is plagued by a
leaky roof, misaligned walls and a faulty electrical system, recover
the difference between the mobile home's9 present value and its value
had it not been in a defective condition? 8 Courts in other jurisdictions, while divided on these questions, generally have agreed that
the homeowner in the above example should be viewed as seeking
recovery for "economic" loss rather than for damage to property.
For these courts, the Restatement's "physical harm to property" language does not inform the determination of whether damage to a
product resulting from its defective condition is compensable in
strict tort liability actions; the issue must be resolved by considering
principles generally applied to claims for economic loss.

3. Economic loss
9
Recovery for economic loss may take one of two forms. 9 First,
recovery may be sought for "direct" damages resulting from harm to
a defective product itself. In these cases, the plaintiff seeks compensation for the deterioration, internal breakage, or depreciation of the
Second, recovery may be
product due to an inherent defect.'
sought for "consequential" damages for harm to a consumer's business expectations, such as loss of profits and the goodwill of a business.1

0

While the courts of New Mexico have yet to determine whether
economic losses are recoverable in strict tort liability actions in this
state, the majority view,' 02 represented by the California Supreme
Court's opinion in Seely v. White Motor Co., 0I is that economic
97. See Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., Inc., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d
846 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977).
98. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
99. For a discussion of the types of economic losses recognized by the courts and the
extent to which they are compensable in strict tort liability actions, see Note, supra note 94.
4220; Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248
100. [19801 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
(Alaska 1977).
101. See Note, supra note 94; 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 141 (1972).
4230.
102. See [19801 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
103. 63 CaL App. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
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losses are not recoverable. 1 0 4 The rationale for this view, never carefully articulated, is that a manufacturer should not be required, in
the absence of an express agreement which has been bargained for, to
guarantee that a consumer's economic expectations of a product will
be satisfied. While it may be appropriate for social and economic
reasons to impose liability on manufacturers for physical injuries
caused by a dangerous condition in their products, these same considerations will not support liability for economic losses. Courts adhering to the majority view conclude that strict tort liability is restricted to cases of personal or indirect property damage, and that
recovery of economic losses should be sought under the Uniform
Commercial Code. 1 0s
The minority view, 10 6 first expressed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in San tor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc., ' 0 7 permits recovery of
economic losses, including lost profits and the reduced value of a defective product. This view has been supported by the argument that
consumer remedies should not depend upon the law of sales contracts
because consumers usually are unable to bargain with a manufacturer
for a promise of indemnity for economic losses. Accordingly, a manufacturer should be liable for all foreseeable injuries caused by a defect
in his product, including economic losses.' 08
It is unclear at this time which view will be adopted by the courts
in New Mexico. It has been suggested that a more appropriate rule of
law would apply an approach in economic loss cases which would
104. Under the court's analysis in Seely, the plaintiff in a strict tort liability action who
has purchased a defective product may not recover damages for lost profits. The court ruled,
however, that recovery would be permitted for injury to the purchased product itself caused
by a defective component part. The court thus appears to draw a distinction between direct
and consequential economic losses, with recovery available for the former loss and unavailable for the latter. Nevertheless, several courts following the Seely decision have expressly
held that direct economic losses for injury to the product itself also are not compensable in
strict tort liability actions. See Sioux City Community School Dist. v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141, Ga. App.
671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc., 190 Neb. 546, 209
N.W.2d 643 (1973).
105. See Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977). The recovery of economic losses, both direct and consequential, is a remedy traditionally provided
for under the Code for breach of warranty. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-714 (1978) (buyer
may recover as damages for any nonconformity of tender the loss resulting from seller's
breach, including the difference between the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted, and, in a proper case, incidental and consequential damages); id. § 55-2-715 (incidental damages include expenses incurred by buyer
by reason of seller's breach, needs which seller knew of and which could not be reasonably
prevented, and injury to buyer or to his property proximately caused by seller's breach).
106. See [1980] 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
4230. Seealso Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057
(1967).
107. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
108. See id.
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focus on the relative bargaining positions between the parties. Under
this flexible rule, sales contract principles would apply where the
parties stand as equals and are able to bargain fairly. This approach
would apply in most commercial settings. Conversely, where, as in
most consumer transactions, the parties are bargaining from unequal
positions, strict tort liability should be applied to permit recovery for
economic losses.' 0' Until the courts resolve the dispute, however,
the New Mexico plaintiff seeking recovery for economic losses should
consider pleading not only strict tort liability, but also liability under
the Uniform Commercial Code, the accepted alternative to recovery
in strict tort in those jurisdictions following the Seely rule.
4. Punitive damages
The issue of whether punitive damages are recoverable in strict tort
liability actions is not addressed in either Section 402A or the decisions of the New Mexico courts. Commentators have raised several
objections to recognition of a right to such a recovery, including that
punitive damages create a windfall,' 0 that they are neither morally
justified nor economically feasible,' ' and that insurance will be unOther commentators,
available to manufacturers to cover liability.'
provides the only
damages
punitive
that
however, have concluded
associated with
profitability
the
undercutting
means of effectively
knowingly fails
manufacturer
a
where
as
misconduct,
certain market
'
'
standards.'
safety
costly
to comply with
The courts in jurisdictions which have considered this issue have
held that punitive damages are recoverable in strict tort actions if
properly pled and proved.' ' It should be noted, however, that in
those cases in which punitive damages were awarded it was established that the defendant had acted recklessly or with willful disregard
for the safety of others.' I The focus was upon the conduct of the
defendant, which ordinarily is not a factor in strict tort actions.'1 6
109. See Note, supra note 94.
110. Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should Not Be
Allowed, 22 Trial Law. Guide 46 (1978).
244
111. Ghiardi & Koehn, PunitiveDamages in Strict Liability Cases, 61 Marq. L. Rev.
(1977).
Ins.
112. Snyman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 44
Cain. J. 402 (1977).
Rev. 1257
113. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L.
justifying
considerations
policy
the
of
analysis
exhaustive
an
(1976). The article provides
recovery of punitive damages in strict tort liability actions.
114. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1021 (1970& Supp. 1980).
4232.
115. Id. Seealso 11980] 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
14.6 (Repl.
116. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A. See also N.M.U.J.I. Civ.
1980).
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This suggests that the question of whether punitive damages may be
recovered under a theory of strict tort liability is a false issue, and
that the right to recover punitive damages does not depend on the
plaintiff's reliance on any particular theory of products liability but
exists whenever a defendant has acted recklessly.' ' As long as the
imposition of punitive damages will both punish a defendant and
deter future acts of gross misconduct, recovery should be allowed
regardless of whether the action is one in negligence, breach of warranty or strict tort liability.
III. ELEMENTS OF PROOF

A plaintiff in a strict tort liability action must establish three elements: first, that the product was "defective"; second, that the product was defective when it left the hands of the individual defendant;
third, that the defect was the cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 18 Each
of these elements will be considered separately.
A. Defectiveness
1. Characterization
No recovery will lie in a strict tort liability action absent proof that
the product in question was defective. Section 402A states that strict
tort liability applies only to sellers of products which are "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to users or their property.
The consumer who is considering bringing a strict tort action therefore must make an initial determination as to whether the product
was "defective" within the meaning of Section 402A.
The Comments to Section 402A define defectiveness in terms of
consumer expectations concerning the safety of a product and the
dangers created by a condition of the product. The Comments provide that a product is "defective" when it is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him."' ' Thus, an airplane leased without oil in its
117. This would be consistent with the view expressed by the New
Mexico courts that
in actions for breach of contract, for example, punitive damages,
although ordinarily not
available to the nonbreaching party, nevertheless may be awarded
was aggravated, wanton, or maliciously intentional. See Fredenburghwhere the wrongdoing
v. Allied Van Lines,
Inc., 79 N.M. 593, 446 P.2d 868 (1968); Stewart v. Potter, 44
N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736
(1940).
118. See Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1978);
Skyhook Corp. v.
Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Tenney v. Seven-Up Co.,
92 N.M. 158, 584 P.2d
205 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92'N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978);
Springer Corp. v. Dallas &
Mavis Forwarding Co., Inc., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846 (Ct. App.
1976), cert. denied, 90
N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Miller Metal Co., 83 N.M.
516, 494 P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1971). See generally Prosser, supra note
2, § 103, at 671-76.
119. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment g.
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engine is defective because a pilot would not expect to be given an
airplane whose engine inevitably will malfunction and cause the plane
to crash.' 2 0 By contrast, ordinary butter is not defective merely because the cholesterol that it contains may lead to heart attacks,
because most consumers appreciate and accept the risks inherent in
eating butter.' 21 What must be shown, according to the Comments,
is that a product as sold was "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics."' 2 2

In Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation Co.,' 2 3 the New Mexico Supreme
Court interpreted these Comments to require that a plaintiff in a
strict tort liability action "need only show that the product was dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer."' 24 No
separate proof of defectiveness is required, according to the court,
because a product which is unreasonably dangerous necessarily is
defective.
The problem created by this statement is that it does not indicate
the proper limits of the term "unreasonably dangerous" How dangerous must a product be before liability under Section 402A is justified? The court in Rudisaile, citing decisions from other states,
offered two possible interpretations. At one point the court stated
that a product is unreasonably dangerous for purposes of Section
402A whenever it is "not reasonably safe."' 2 5 At another point the
court indicated that liability will attach where a product is "not fit
for its intended purpose."' 2 6 This last definition, however, was rejected in a court of appeals opinion which preceeded Rudisaile. In
Tenney v. Seven-Up Co.,1 27 the court ruled that a bottle of soda pop
containing a foreign substance, while defective in the sense that it
was "unsuitable for its intended purpose," nevertheless was not unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of Section 402A because
the substance was "harmless" and had not caused any direct injury
when the bottle's contents had been consumed. Under the court of
appeals view, strict liability could be imposed only where a product
"involves a risk of death or serious personal injury or substantial
120. See Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d 175 (1979).
121. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment i.
122. Id.
123. 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d 175 (1979).
124. Id. at 577, 592 P.2d at 177.
542
-,
125. Id. (quoting Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145,
P.2d 774, 779 (1975)).
126. Id. (quoting Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128, 133 (Ala. 1976)).
127. 92 N.M. 158, 584 P.2d 205 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324
(1978).
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damage." 1 28 While this statement may be criticized as suggesting
that a plaintiff must prove that a product was unusually or extremely
dangerous,' '9 and for being inconsistent with both the "not reasonably safe" language in Rudisaile and public policies favoring a broad
scope of strict tort liability, the views expressed in Tenney have never
been expressly disapproved. The court's opinion in Rudisaile, which
does not discuss Tenney, thus leaves unclear the degree of dangerousness which must be present in order to support a finding that a product was unreasonably dangerous.
One recent development which may serve to eliminate much of the
confusion generated by Rudisaile and Tenney is the adoption in 1980
of a set of Uniform Jury Instructions for use in product liability
actions. U.J.I. 14.6 provides, in part, that a "supplier" of a product is
"liable for harm proximately caused by an unreasonable risk of injury
resulting from a condition of the product or from the manner of its
use. Such a risk makes the product defective."' 3 The phrase "unreasonable risk of injury" is then defined in U.J.I. 14.7 as "a risk
which a reasonably prudent person having full knowledge of the risk
would find unacceptable."' 3' This phrase may be viewed as more
appropriate than the term "unreasonably dangerous" found in Section 402A and in the case law in that it is less likely to imply to the
fact-finder the "ultrahazardous" standard suggested in Tenney. The
focus remains, however, on the condition of a product and the expectations of consumers with respect to that product, the same focus
as is found in the Comments to Section 402A. What the authors of
these instructions have attempted is to create a workable standard
which leaves to the fact-finder the determination of whether a product's potential for harm is sufficiently great to justify a finding of defectiveness for purposes of imposing strict tort liability. This standard
necessarily is a flexible one which takes into account such factors as
the individual product's social utility, the likelihood of injury, public
awareness and acceptance of the danger, and the feasibility of eliminating the danger without impairing the product's usefulness or
making it unduly expensive.'32 If this standard is no more precise
than the one formulated in Rudisaile, it is at least capable of broader
application and thus may serve to better effectuate the purposes
underlying the doctrine of strict tort.
128. Id. at 160, 584 P.2d 207.
129. Id. at 161, 584 P.2d at 208 (Sutin, J., dissenting).
130. See N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 14.6 (Repl. 1980).
131. See N.M.U.J.1. Civ. 14.7 (Supp. 1981).
132. See Committee Comment to N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 14.7 (Supp. 1981). Seealso Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).

Summer 19811

STRICT TORT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

There is at least one type of product, however, whose potential for
harm will be found acceptable as a matter of law to the ordinary consumer made aware of its condition. Comment k to Section 402A explains that "[t] here are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use .... Such a product, properly prepared

and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective
'
Comment k indicates, hownor is it unreasonably dangerous."
ever, that the special treatment afforded this type of product is justified only where the product serves socially useful and desirable purposes. For example where a patient contracted serum hepatitus after
receiving a blood transfusion, it was held that no strict liability would
lie where it was shown that (1) there was a medically recognized risk
that serum hepatitus could be transmitted through a blood transfusion, (2) no test could adequately detect the virus, (3) no process
could destroy it without also destroying the blood, (4) a proper
warning was given the individuals administering the transfusion, and
(5) blood was a useful and desirable product which at times was
1
essential in saving lives. 3'

Summary judgment was granted to the

defendants and upheld on appeal solely on the basis of these findings.
The result in this case illustrates that there are some instances in
which the reasonableness of a product's dangerous condition will be
presumed as a matter of law. This presumption is probably justified,
however, only where the product's social value greatly outweighs its
social costs in injury to consumers. In all other cases, the acceptability
of the risk of injury posed by a product should be determined by the
fact-finder.
2. Types of defects
Product defects may be divided into three categories: design defects, manufacturing defects, and defects resulting from an inadequate warning. While in many cases it will not be necessary to identify
the particular type of defect which has caused a plaintiffs injuries,
an understanding of the differences between these three types can
aid the parties to a strict tort liability action by assisting the plaintiff
in the construction of his prima facie case on the issue of defectiveness, and the defendant in his choice of defenses.
The first category of product defects covers flaws in a product's
design. A design defect results from inadequacies in the plans or spe133. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment k (emphasis in the original).
134. See Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974).
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cifications used in producing a product, as in the choice of materials
of inadequate strength.' 3 A product also may suffer from a design
defect if it lacks safety features or devices necessary to render it
reasonably safe for its intended use.' 3 6 Thus, a power press could be
in a defective condition if its design did not incorporate barrier guards
which would prevent an operator's hands from being caught in the
press during its operating cycle. 1 3 7 The question which must be
asked in design defect cases involving the failure of a product to incorporate a safety feature or device "is whether the product, absent
such feature or device, is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property."' 38
The second category of product defects involves manufacturing
flaws, or construction defects. These defects occur in the manufacturing process when an otherwise non-defective design or construction procedure is not carried out perfectly. An example of this type
of defect is where a seam on a properly designed compressor tank is
improperly welded.' 39 In manufacturing defect cases the plaintiff
must show that the product deviated in a material way from adequate
design specifications or performance standards, or failed to perform
as other units in the same product line perform,' 4 0 as where a new
Lincoln Continental develops a critical malfunction in its steering
mechanism which normally does not develop in new models.' '
The third category of product defects involves those situations in
which the manufacturer of an otherwise well-designed and constructed product fails to provide the consumer with an adequate
warning informing him of its potential dangers. A drug used to treat
wounds which is sold without a warning that repeated use could
cause irreversible deafness falls within this category of defect.' 42 The
greatest number of strict tort liability actions in New Mexico have involved products alleged to have been defective because of an inadequate warning.' " The principles applicable to inadequate warning
135. D. Noel & J. Phillips, Products Liability in a Nutshell 141 (1981).
136. Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1978).
137. Id.
138. Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 147, 560 P.2d 934, 938 (1977).
139. See Grammer v. Kohlhass Tank & Equip. Co., 93 N.M. 685, 604 P.2d 823 (Ct.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).
140. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 15, at § 16A[41 [f][iii].
141. See Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975).
142. See Richards v. The Upjohn Co., 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. (Ct. App. June 5, 1980),
cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980).
143. See.id.; Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1978); Madrid v. Mine
Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1973); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M.
143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 84 N.M. 796, 508 P.2d 1283
(1973); Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359 (1972); First Nat'l Bank in

Summer 1981)

STRICT TORT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

cases therefore have become well-settled in this jurisdiction, and may
be briefly outlined.
Two questions arise in defective warning cases: under what circumstances will a duty be imposed on a manufacturer to provide any
warning whatsoever; and, if a duty to warn exists, by what standards
will the adequacy of the warning be determined. The first question44is
treated as a question of law, while the second is a question of fact.'
The duty to warn consumers of a product's dangers generally will
arise whenever the manufacturer has reason to anticipate that harm
may result from a particular use of a product. 1 4 The manufacturer
of pharmaceuticals is required, for example, to warn of the dangers
known to inhere in the use of a drug in amounts exceeding a prescribed dosage.' 46 Where a danger is not reasonably foreseeable, the
47
product is not unreasonably dangerous and no duty to warn exists.'
Moreover, there is no duty to warn of dangers of which the user of
the product actually is aware. 48 Even though the average consumer
may not have known of the particular danger, as long as the plaintiff
in fact appreciated the risk of injury created by a condition of the
product the manufacturer will not be held liable for a failure to warn.
Under this view, a skilled gymnast who fractured his spine while exercising on a trampoline which contained no warning of the dangers
in falling off of the trampoline cannot recover against the manufacturer. 149
The adequacy of any warning which a manufacturer is required as
a matter of law to give to consumers must meet the following criteria,
developed by the court of appeals in the Nor-Am case.' " First,
Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763,
527 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974).
144. First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74,
537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975).
145. Id.; Schrib v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1969); Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment h.
146. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment h.
147. Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 84 N.M. 796, 508 P.2d 1283 (1973); First Nat'l Bank
in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975); Schrib v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458
P.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1969); Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment h.
148. Madrid v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1973); Skyhook
Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16,
498 P.2d 1359 (1972). See also N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 14.5, 14.6 (Repl. 1980).
149. See Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359 (1972).
150. First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74,
537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975). Accord, Richards
v. The Upjohn Co., 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 516 (Ct. App. June 5, 1980), cert. denied, 94 N.M.
675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980). For a discussion of the facts of Nor-Am, see text accompanying
notes 38-44 supra.
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"[t] he warning must adequately indicate the scope of the danger."' I
This requires that any danger of a product which could cause serious
injury, including "latent" dangers, be identified specifically. Second,

" 'the warning must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of harm that could result from the danger ... .' " s 2 A warning
must inform a consumer, for example, whether a product's dangerous
condition poses a risk of death. Third, "[t] he physical aspects of the

warning- conspicuousness, prominence, relative size of print, etc.must be adequate to alert the reasonably prudent person."' 3

Fourth, "[t]he means used to convey the warning must be ade-

quate."' s

Was, for example, a poster, magazine ad or circular ade-

quate to convey the warning, or should a label or tag containing a
warning have been attached to the product? Finally, "[a] simple
directive warning ... may be inadequate, without some indication of
consequences from failure to follow the directive."' s ' If these five
criteria have been satisfied, the product has been made safe for its intended use and the seller cannot be held strictly liable in tort by
reason of an allegedly defective warning.' 5 6
Although the three categories of product defects are distinct from

one another, in many strict tort actions it nevertheless will be unnecessary to identify the particular type of defect which a product is
alleged to be suffering from in order for the plaintiff to recover. The
supreme court has stated, in this regard, that "[i] f a condition of a

product is unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer or to his
property, we see no reason why distinctions should be made as to the

nature of the condition or defect."'

5

7

In many other cases, however, recognition of the differences be-

tween types of defect will benefit the litigants. First, an identifica151. 88 N.M. at 83, 537 P.2d at 691.
152. Id. at 83-84, 537 P.2d at 691-92 (quoting Comment, The Manufaeturer'sDuty to
Warn of Dangers Involved in Use of a Product, 1967 Wash. U.L.Q. 206, 212).
153. 88 N.M. at 84, 537 P.2d at 692.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Shrib v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1969). See also
Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment j. It may be possible, however, to hold the
defendant strictly liable for the reason that his product still suffers from a design defect in
its failure to incorporate a safety device. The New Mexico courts have not squarely faced
the issue of whether an adequate warning will always negate liability where a safety device
was available at a nominal cost and would have rendered the product safer for use than if
there had been only a warning. See generally Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560
P.2d 934 (1977) (crane which failed to incorporate safety device held not defective because
danger was obvious and adequate warning of danger was attached to crane); Fabian v. E. W.
Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1978) (held, that unreasonably dangerous condition of
punch press lacking safety barriers could have resulted from defect in press itself or from
lack of adequate warning).
157. Skyhook v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 147, 560 P.2d 934, 938 (1977).
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tion of the type of defect alleged to have caused injury will aid the
parties in clarifying the issues for trial. For example, in warning cases
the defendant ultimately is concerned with satisfying the five criteria
established in Nor-Am; evidence of the process of a product's manufacture will be irrelevant. Second, the nature of a product's defect
can significantly affect the availability of defenses to liability. Some
jurisdictions recognize, for example, that in design defect cases the
economic or technological feasibility of a safer design may be raised
as a defense to liability.' ' 8 Thus, in some states the manufacturer of
an automobile lacking an air bag which prevents serious injuries from
collisions at speeds of fifty-five miles per hour would not be held
strictly liable in tort for failing to incorporate the air bag into the
automobile's design if a design change would result in a substantially
5 9 In
increased price which consumers would be unwilling to pay.'
contrast, feasibility normally would not be an issue in a manufacturing defect case, because most departures from design specifications
and procedures can be feasibly corrected. 1 6 0 The nature of a product's defect therefore can affect both the plaintiff's presentation of
the issues and the defendant's response to an allegation of strict tort
liability. Considerations of this nature should not be overlooked in
the preparation of a strict tort action.
3. Proof of defectiveness
The existence of a defect in a product may be proved in several
ways, including the use of circumstantial evidence. 1 6 1 Thus, the
plaintiff in a strict tort liability action need not offer direct proof
that a defect existed in the product which caused his injury. 1 6 2 All
that is required is that he establish facts and circumstances which
give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the allegation of
defectiveness.1 6 ' The plaintiff's burden is satisfied, in other words,
158. See Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972); Barker v.
Lull Eng'r Co., 20 CaL 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 IlL App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972). But see Fabian v. E. W.
Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1978), in which the court rejected an instruction which
provided that design liability in part could be determined with regard for the state of technology existing at the time the product was designed.
159. See Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of the Art Defense, 43
Albany L. Rev. 941, 949-50 (1979).
160. Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 101, 104-105 (1977).
161. Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., Inc., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846
(Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977).
162. Id.; 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 15, § 16A[4] [c] [ii].
163. See N.M.J.J.1. Civ. 3.11 (Repl. 1980). See also Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis
Forwarding Co., Inc., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254,
561 P.2d 1347 (1977).
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"by showing sufficient facts to allow a jury to infer defective quality. . . .164

One method of proving defectiveness circumstantially is to introduce evidence of the violation of industry and governmental stan-

dards relating to requirements in the manufacture or design of a
product. For example, national standards compiled by an organiza-

tion of mechanical engineers for use in the construction of pressurized vehicles have been held admissible as evidence where the standards were relied upon by a manufacturer of compressor tanks. 6 5
Any deviation from standards prescribed by law, by administrative

regulation, or by industry custom creates an inference of defect
where compliance would have avoided a risk of injury.'

66

The con-

verse of this principle is not true, however, so that evidence of compliance with industry or government standards will not establish a
lack of defectiveness. Many courts view evidence of compliance as
relevant only to the issue of due care, and therefore exclude such evi1
dence on the issue of defectiveness. 6 7
Also relevant is evidence of alternative designs or safety devices
which would have rendered a product safe for its intended or foreseeable use.' 6 8 At least in those cases where the alternative design or
device is readily available at a nominal cost,' 6 9 the inference is
strengthened that the defendant's product is dangerous beyond a
degree acceptable to the ordinary consumer. One effective method of
introducing this type of evidence is to offer proof that other members of the defendant's industry incorporated such designs or devices.
Many jurisdictions regard such proof as a persuasive method of establishing not only the feasibility of the alternative design but also the
standard of defectiveness which should be applied to the defendant's
1

product.

70

164. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 15, § 16A[4] [el [ii].
165. See Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank & Equip. Co., 93 N.M. 685, 604 P.2d 823 (Ct.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980) (evidence of Standards of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers used in the manufacture of a compressor tank
ruled admissible).
166. See W. Kimble & R. Lesher, Products Liability, § 224 at 237-38 (1979); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531, 1555-57 (1973).
167. See Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 372, 154 Cal. Rptr. 122
(1979); Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wash. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966).
168. See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 CaL 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Deem v. Woodbine
Mfg. Co., 89 N.M. 50, 546, P.2d 1207 (Ct App.), rev'd, 89 N.M. 172, 548 P.2d 452 (1976).
169. See Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979); Kerns v.
Engelke, 76 IlL 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859 (1979); Deem v. Woodbine Mfg. Co., 89 N.M. 50,
546 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 89 N.M. 172, 548 P.2d 452 (1976).
170. See Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974); Garst v.
General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971). See also W. Kimble & R. Lesher,
Products Liability § 228 at 245-47 (1979).
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Another method of circumstanctial proof of defectiveness is to
show that comparable products made by the defendant had caused,
or were capable of causing, similar injuries.' 7I This method is especially useful where the specific product that caused the plaintiff's injuries is no longer available, but there is evidence that identical products made by the defendant are defective in the same manner as is
alleged of the product actually used by the plaintiff.' ' 2
A plaintiff also may establish defectiveness simply by eliminating
other likely causes of his injuries.' 7 ' When all other explanations are
proven impossible, the only conclusion left to the fact-finder is that
it was a defect which caused the plaintiffs injuries. A prima facie
case of defectiveness can be made based solely on this method of
proof.' 14
One of the most effective means of proving defectiveness is through
the use of expert testimony. It is the rare products liability case which
does not require some scientific or technical evidence to be introduced at trial. The expert witness plays an important role in communicating and commenting on such evidence to the fact-finder.' "' A
qualified expert should be permitted to testify, for example, on such
matters as the design of a product, the adequacy of tests or inspections made during the manufacturing process, the adequacy of materials used, the adequacy of the method of construction, the nature
and feasibility of additional safeguards which could have been taken,
and the custom and practices within an industry.' 76 Once the evidence presented by an expert is admitted, it is for the fact-finder to
draw reasonable inferences and conclusions from his testimony. The
New Mexico courts generally accord great weight to expert testimony
in strict tort actions by refusing to overturn a jury's verdict where
the argument for reversal is that the evidence presented by an expert
witness was insufficient to permit a reasonable inference of defectiveness.1 7 7
The amount of circumstantial evidence necessary to prove that a
product is defective obviously will vary with the circumstances of a
given case. The mere fact of injury should be insufficient to establish
171. W. Kimble & R. Lesher, Products Liability § 225 at 238-41 (1979); Prosser, supra
note 2, § 103, at 673.
172. See Sheldon, CircumstantialProof in ProductsLiability Cases: A DangerousPrecedent, 30 Federation Ins. Court Q. 265, 269 (1980).
173. Id. at 270; Prosser, supra note 2, § 103, at 673.
174. See Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 1306 (1976).
175. For a general discussion of the importance of expert evidence in product liability
actions, see 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 12.02[11.
176. Id. at § 12.02[21 [b].
177. See Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1970); Grammer
v. Kohlhaas Tank & Equip. Co., 93 N.M. 685, 604 P.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied,
94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).
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defectiveness.' 7 8 There may be, however, some circumstances where
common experience would indicate that an event would not have occurred in the absence of a defect, as in the case of an exploding beverage bottle.1 7 9 This final principle is analogous to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor applied in negligence actions, except that the fact of
injury raises an inference of defectiveness rather than an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant.' 80 This principle reflects
generally the plaintiff's burden with respect to proof of a product defect, which is that he is required in all cases to establish facts and circumstances sufficient to create a reasonable inference of defectiveness. The fact of injury is but one consideration to be made.
B. The Product Was Defective When It Left the Defendant's Hands
Once it has been shown that a product had a defect which rendered
the product unreasonably dangerous, the plaintiff must establish that
the product was defective when it left the defendant's control. 1 81 At
least one jurisdiction allows the plairntiff, once a defect has been
proven, to shift to the defendant the burden of proof as to whether a
defect existed at the time the product left his hands.' 8 2 This is not,
however, the accepted view in New Mexico. The burden rests on the
plaintiff to introduce enough evidence to permit a reasonable inference that a product was defective while still in the defendant's

hands.'

8 3

Several difficulties may be encountered in proving that a defect
existed while the product was under the control of a defendant. The
first concerns the effect of lapse of time and long continued use. If a
product has been used continually for a long period of time before
injury occurs, it is less likely that a reasonable inference may be
178. Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1970); Skyhook
Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., Inc., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254,
561 P.2d 1347 (1977).
179. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 15, § 16A[4] [e] [iii] ; Prosser,supra note
2, § 103, at 673-74.
180. See D. Noel & J. Phillips, Products Liability in a Nutshell 312-16 (1981).
181. State Farm Fire & Ca. Co. v. Miller Metal Co., 83 N.M. 516, 494 P.2d 178 (Ct.
App. 1971); Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment g.
182. See Curtiss v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 7 Wash. App. 451, 499 P.2d 915
(1972), aff'd 82 Wash. 2d 455, 511 P.2d 991 (1973). For a discussion of the equities of this
approach, see 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 15, § 16A[4] [e] [iii].
183. See Tenney v. Seven-Up Co., 92 N.M. 158, 584 P.2d 205 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978); Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., Inc.,
90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1976); State Farm Fire& Casualty Co. v. Miller Metal
Co., 83 N.M. 516, 494 P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1972).
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drawn that the product was defective when sold.' I I It may be just
as reasonable to conclude that the injury was caused by normal wear
and tear on an otherwise non-defective product, and the accepted
view is that manufacturers are not required under the doctrine 8of
1
strict tort liability to produce goods which will never wear out.'
Conversely, an injury occurring a short time after a defendant has relinquished control over the injury-causing product may raise an inference that the defect existed while the product was still under the defendant's control.' 86 Thus, a grinding stone which disintegrates during its initial use is much more likely to have been defective when it
left the manufacturer's control than is one which disintegrates only
after many hours of use; it is more reasonable to infer defectiveness

in the former case than in the latter.' 87
A second difficulty arises where the product has passed through
several hands in the distribution chain, as from manufacturer to
wholesaler to retailer to buyer to actual user. To hold liable the party
most capable of satisfying a judgment in his favor, the plaintiff must
be able to account for any handling of the product by intermediaries
so as to make unreasonable any inference that the defect was created
after the defendant relinquished control. The plaintiff must prove
that the product remained "substantially unchanged" from the time
it left the defendant's hands until it reached the plaintiff.' 8 8 New
Mexico plaintiffs are aided on this point, however, by the court's
opinion in Nor-Am, 18 which adopts a restrictive view of the circumstances which will support a finding that a product has undergone a
substantial change.
184. See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977) (fact that crane
had been operated for a period of five years without injury relied upon by the court in its
conclusion that crane was not unreasonably dangerous).
185. See Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959);
Barich v. Ottenstror, 170 Mont. 38, 550 P.2d 395 (1976); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
186. See General Motors Corp. v. Franks, 509 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (fact
that truck was only five months old at time of injury relied on to find that truck's defect
existed when sold by the defendant). But see Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding
Co., Inc., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d
1347 (1977), in which the court held that it could not be reasonably inferred, under the
circumstances of the case, that a truck tire was defective when a blowout occurred after
only forty miles of use, even though the tire was properly inflated and the truck was driven
in a proper manner on a paved road.
187. See Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71
(1976).
188. See Tenney v. Seven-Up Co., 92 N.M. 158, 159, 583 P.2d 205, 206 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978).
189. See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
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The only effective means of satisfying the burden on this issue is
to introduce evidence showing that the defect could have arisen only
while the product was in the defendant's hands, as where the defendant is the manufacturer of the product and it is shown that the
product's defect was a manufacturing flaw for which the defendant
must be responsible. The plaintiff clearly will have offered evidence
from which an inference of the manufacturer's control over the defective product can be drawn, and consequently he will be able to
hold liable every subsequent link in the chain of distribution.' 90
C. Defectiveness as the Cause of Injury
The final element which the plaintiff must prove is the casual connection between a product defect and the injury.' 9 ' The plaintiffs
burden with respect to causation is two-fold: he must show that the
defect was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the injury.' 9 2 For the defect to be a cause in fact of an injury it must be
shown that without the defect the injury would not have occurred. 93
Once the plaintiff has established that the defect was a cause in fact
of injury, he must then prove proximate cause. The question underlying the proximate cause requirement is whether the defendant
should be held legally responsible for what he has actually caused.' 9 4
190. Strict tort liability may be imposed on "sellers" of defective products. Thus, any
party in the distribution chain of a defective product may be held strictly liable for injuries
caused by the product's defective condition, even though a defendant seller can show that
the defect actually was created by someone higher up in the distribution chain than himself.
Such a defendant would be protected in New Mexico, however, if he can show that it was
another party's "active conduct" which caused the injury. In such cases the courts permit
the defendant to shift the entire financial burden of any adverse judgment to the other
party. See Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espafiola, __ N.M.
-,618
P.2d 1230 (1980).
191. See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); Tenney v. SevenUp Co., 92 N.M. 158, 584 P.2d 205 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324
(1978); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller Metal Co., 83 N.M. 516, 494 P.2d 178 (Ct.
App.. 1971).
192. See Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1974),
modified, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229 (1975). It will be noted by the reader that the majority of the cases relied upon to support the statements in this section of the text did not involve allegations of strict tort liability or even an injury-producing product. Rather, they
were actions for simple negligence. This reliance may be explained by the lack of discussion
of the concept of "proximate cause" in the products liability case law of New Mexico, and
the fact that the essential issue is the same whether the cause of action is one for negligence
or strict tort products liability, that is, should a defendant be held liable for a plaintiff's injuries if caused in fact by either his conduct or a defect in his product. "In general, the same
problems as to tests of proximate cause exist in Products liability cases as in other negligence cases." 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 11.02.
193. See Terrelv. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1974),
modified, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229 (1975); Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170,
429 P.2d 368 (1967).
194. Prosser, supra note 2, § 42, at 244.
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The crucial issue in determining whether a defect is the proximate
cause of a plaintiff's injuries is the extent to which such injuries were
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defect.1 9 s If the injury
resulting from a product's defective condition could not reasonably
have been foreseen or anticipated, no liability will be found even
though it can be shown that the defect was a cause in fact or injury.
Proximate cause is used as a limitation on the responsibility of a defendant in situations where it would be unfair to hold him liable for
a failure to act to avoid a risk of injury to others when there was no
reason to believe that such risk existed.' 96
One recurring manner in which the proximate cause requirement is
applied to limit a defendant's liability arises when it can be shown
that an injury was not caused solely by a defendant's negligence or a
defect in the defendant's product but also was brought about by an
"independent intervening cause." Independent intervening causes, or
concurrent causes, are "causes of natural or human origin, which
come into active operation at a later time to change a situation resulting from a defendant's conduct."' 9 ' The manufacturer of a potentially dangerous chemical, for example, could issue a warning to an
industrial user concerning the product's safe use, but that user then
could fail to communicate this warning to its employees, thereby reThe question of whether the
sulting in injury to a workman.'
manufacturer should be held liable for the workman's injuries is one
of the foreseeability of the events occurring after the chemical was
marketed. As stated by the New Mexico Supreme Court, an independent intervening cause will "break the chain of sequence" and prevent recovery from the defendant where the cause "interrupts the
natural sequence of events, turns aside their cause, prevents the
natural and probable results of the original act or omission, and produces a different result, that could not have been reasonably foreseen."

1 99

Because cause in fact and proximate cause are ultimate facts, usually
to be inferred from proven facts,2 0 0 causation can be established by
195. See generally Castillo v. United States, 552 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1977); F & T Co.
v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 594 P.2d 745 (1979); Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M.
405, 524 P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1974), modified, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229 (1975); 1 L.
Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 11.02.
196. See 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 11:02; Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d 1021 (Ct App. 1974), modified, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d
229 (1975).
197. Prosser, supra note 2 § 44, at 271-72.
198. See Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812, 579 P.2d 940 (1978).
199. Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 411-12, 285 P.2d 507, 514 (1955).
200. See Binns v. Schoenbrun, 81 N.M. 489, 468 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1970).
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circumstantial evidence.2 0 ' The plaintiff must introduce enough facts
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that it is more likely
than not that a product's defect caused his injuries. This process
often will allow a plaintiff to "use the same circumstantial or expert evidence to establish both defectiveness and causation ..."2 0 2
While the plaintiff is not required to introduce expert testimony on
the issue of causation,2 0 3 such testimony can be useful.
IV. DEFENSES
The defenses to strict tort liability, as in all tort actions, may be
divided into two basic categories. The first category includes those
defenses which disprove an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case,
and are described as "negative" defenses to liability. 2 04 They are inyoked, for example, to disprove that a product was "defective" within
the meaning of Section 402A, or that a defect was a proximate cause
of injury. The second category is comprised of "affirmative" defenses, or those defenses which excuse a defendant from liability, in
whole or in part, regardless of the truth of a plaintiff's allegations by
raising matters outside the complaint. Certain types of plaintiff conduct, such as voluntarily encountering a known danger, provide an
example of matters outside the complaint which may give rise to an
affirmative defense.
A. Negative Defenses
There are numerous defenses to a plaintiff's prima facie case for
strict tort liability. Many of these already have been suggested in the
discussions of the scope of Section 402A and of the plaintiff's burden in strict tort actions. What follows, then, is a summary list of
negative defenses which may be available to avoid
liability in a given
20
strict tort liability action, the defendant arguing: 1
1. He is not a "seller" within the meaning of Section 402A.2 06
Strict tort liability does not extend, for example, to the casual seller
of defective goods.
201. Richards v. The Upjohn Co., 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 516 (Ct. App. June 5, 1980),
cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980).
202. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1085 (1967). Accord, 63 Am. Jur. 2dProductsLiability § 135, at 143 (1972).
203. Richards v. Upjohn Co., 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 516 (Ct. App. June 5, 1980), cert.
denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980).
204. See 2A Moore's Federal Practice § 8.19[1l] (2d ed. 1981).
205. Because these defenses rebut specific elements of the plaintiff's case, the reader is
referred to the sections of this Comment which deal with those elements.
206. See text accompanying notes 27-44 supra.
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2. The plaintiff is not a "user or consumer" entitled to protection

402A, as where the plaintiff received his injuries as a
under Section
2 07
bystander.
3. The transaction between the plaintiff and defendant was in the
nature of the rendering of a service, a consumer transaction not
within the reach of Section 402A. 2 08
4. The plaintiff's injuries are not compensable in a strict tort
action in New Mexico insofar as recovery is being sought for emotional trauma or economic loss. 2 0 9
5. The product was not in an unreasonably dangerous condition in
that the product was 2"harmless" to the user;2' 1 the product was
"unavoidably unsafe"; 1 the product's dangers were known to the
user;2 12 adequate safety devices 2 1 3 or warnings 2 1 4 were provided;
or, it was not technologically or economically feasible to construct a
safer product. 2 1 '

6. The product, as originally sold, was not in a defective condition;
any risk of injury was created by a substantial change in the product
after the defendant had relinquished control and for which he was
not responsible. 2 16

7. The defect was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries because the injuries were not reasonably foreseeable, 2 1 7 or because an independent cause intervened to break the chain of causation.2

8

1

While this list is not exhaustive, it outlines the most important defenses made available by the Comments to Section 402A and addresses each of the elements which must be established in product
liability actions. The Comments to Section 402A, in light of the deference given to them by the courts,2 1 9 should be analyzed carefully
in every strict tort action to determine whether one or more of them
will provide a basis for a defense. In addition, consideration should
be given to each of the elements which the plaintiff must establish
before he will be entitled to recover, the difficulties which he will en207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
note 28 supra.

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

45-61 supra.
6 2-82 supra.
83-112 supra.
126-29 supra.
133-34 supra.
148-49 supra.
135-38 supra.
142-56 supra.
15 8-60 supra.
188-89 supra.
191-99 supra.
197-99 supra.
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counter with respect to proof of any one element, and the evidence

available to defeat the plaintiff's case as to these elements. These
considerations will then suggest the negative defenses which should

be relied upon to refute strict tort liability.
B. Affirmative Defenses

1. Statutes of limitation
The first affirmative defense which litigants must consider is the
running of the applicable statute of limitation. Depending upon the
nature of the plaintiff's injuries, various statutes could be applied in

New Mexico. This results from the view of the courts that "the nature
of the right sued upon, and not the form of action or relief demanded,
determines the applicability of the statute of limitations."'2

2

Where the plaintiff's strict tort action is for an injury to the person, the action must be brought within three years after the cause of
action accures."2 ' There has been some dispute among the New Mex-

ico courts as to when an action for personal injuries "accrues" for
purposes of the applicable statutes. The courts at one time adopted a
restrictive view that a cause of action accrued "at the time of the
wrongful act causing injury." '2

22

Under this view, it was possible for

an insulation worker who contracted asbestosis over a twenty-year
period to be denied recovery for any injury resulting from exposure
which occurred more than three years prior to the filing of his action.2 2 ' This view has since been rejected, however, and a cause of

action for personal injuries now accrues "from the time the injury
manifests itself in a physically objective manner and is ascertainable." 2 2 4

In New Mexico, strict tort actions for injury to property, including

economic loss, 2 25 are governed by a four-year statute of limitation. 22

6

220. Taylor v. Lovelace Clinic, 78 N.M. 460, 462, 432 P.2d 816, 818 (1967).
221. See N.M. Stat. Ann § 37-1-1, -8 (1978). For the proposition that an action in strict
liability should be governed by a state's statute of limitation for torts, see 2 L. Frumer & M.
Friedman, supra note 15, § 16A[5] [h] ; Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 455 (1979). For the proposition that N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8 (1978) governs strict tort actions for redress of personal
injuries, see Bassham v. Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007 (D.N.M. 1971).
222. Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 287, 383 P.2d 250, 252 (1963). Accord, Bassham
v. Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007 (D.N.M. 1971).
223. See Bassham v. Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Co., 327 F. Supp. 1007 (D.N.M. 1971).
224. Peralta v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 391, 394, 564 P.2d 194, 197 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977) (emphasis by the court).
225. To the extent that economic losses are recoverable in New Mexico, the same fouryear statute of limitation applicable to actions for property losses would control. No other
statute addresses economic losses, and the four-year statute of limitation is the one applied
to all actions not otherwise provided for. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4 (1978).
226. See id.
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Such actions must be brought within four years after the accrual of
the cause of action, 2 2' which is the point in time that the injury was
discovered by the plaintiff.2 2 8
Wrongful death actions are governed by a special three-year statute
of limitation. This statute begins to run from the date of death.2 2 9
In cases involving claims for more than one type of injury, the
courts apply New Mexico's various statutes of limitation individually
to each claim. 2 30 Thus, it is possible in a given case to permit recovery for property damage while denying recovery for personal injuries.2 3 1 Defendants therefore should consider the nature of the injuries sued upon to determine whether any New Mexico statute of
limitation affords either partial or complete relief from strict tort
liability.
2. Plaintiff's misconduct
The affirmative defense which is probably of greatest interest to
litigants is that of plaintiff misconduct. This defense has been discussed in several New Mexico cases. Unfortunately, a complete catalogue
of the types of plaintiff misconduct which will prevent recovery has
never been clearly established by the New Mexico courts. Adding to
the uncertainty with respect to the limits of this defense is the recent
judicial adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence in New
Mexico. This development is likely to have a significant impact upon
a defendant's strategy in his reliance upon plaintiff misconduct as an
affirmative defense to liability.
a. types of plaintiff misconduct
The New Mexico courts have identified four types of plaintiff misconduct and have discussed whether they may be relied upon as affirmative defenses to strict tort liability. These are (1) failure to discover
or guard against a product defect, (2) assumption of risk, (3) misuse
of a product, and (4) all other forms of contributory negligence by a
plaintiff.
failure to discover or guard againsta product defect
A plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care to discover or guard
against a defect in a product is not available as an affirmative defense
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See
See
See
See
Id.

id.; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-1 (1978).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-7 (1978).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-2 (1978).
Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1980).
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to strict tort liability. Comment n to Section 402A provides that
"[c] ontributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence." The New
Mexico courts have expressly adopted this position.2 32 Thus, the
failure of the lessee of an airplane to conduct a customary preflight
check, which would have disclosed that the plane had no oil in its engine, will not bar recovery against the lessor of the plane in an action
for strict tort liability. 3
assumption of risk
The New Mexico courts have adopted a contrary view, however,
with respect to plaintiff misconduct which amounts to assumption of
risk. Comment n to Section 402A further provides that "the form of
contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes
under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section
as in other cases of strict liability." 2 3 4 This position also has been
adopted by the New Mexico courts.2 35 Thus, a plaintiff who has
been injured as a result of a defect in a product will be barred from
recovery in strict tort where he was aware of the product's defective
condition and knew of the danger involved, but nevertheless pro2
ceeded unreasonably to make use of the product. 36
product misuse
With respect to the third type of plaintiff misconduct, the New
Mexico courts have failed to provide a clear statement as to when a
plaintiffs misuse of a product may constitute an affirmative defense.
232. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540 P.2d 249 (1975). See also Jasper v. Skyhook
Corp., 89 N.M. 98, 101, 547 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 90
N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
233. See Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d 175 (1979).
234. The reader should note that assumption of risk in New Mexico, just as in Section
402A, is treated as a form of contributory negligence. Assumption of risk has been abolished as a separate defense in New Mexico. See Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d
1147 (1971). This shift in characterization is more than a matter of semantics, for under the
new standard it must be shown that a plaintiff did more than merely assume a known risk.
It must also be shown that he did so unreasonably. See Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319,
330 n.24 (Alaska 1970).
235. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540 P.2d 249 (1975). See also Rudisaile v. Hawk
Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d 175 (1979); Jasper v. Skyhook Corp., 89 N.M. 98,
547 P.2d 1140 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
236. See Jasper v. Skyhook Corp., 89 N.M. 98, 101, 547 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Ct. App.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P. 2d 934 (1977).
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Misuse of a product occurs where the product has been used in an abnormal manner, or in a manner unintended by the product's manufacturer. 2 3 " An example is where a ladder designed for use on hard
2
level surfaces is used on infirm and sloping ground. 38 Although
comment n to Section 402A makes no mention of this type of plaintiff misconduct, several jurisdictions recognize certain forms of product misuse as an affirmative defense in strict tort actions. This recog2
nition has been noted by one New Mexico court. 39 Unfortunately,
the court did not reach the question of whether, and under what circumstances, misuse would be available as an affirmative defense in
New Mexico, 2"4 and the issue has not been decided in any subsequent case. 2 41
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that misuse of a product
may provide the basis for an affirmative defense to strict tort liability.2 42 The majority of courts limit the defense, however, to situations in which the particular manner of use was not reasonably fore2 43
seeable to the manufacturer, and was a proximate cause of injury.
The stated rationale for this majority rule is that a manufacturer is
not liable for all harms occurring in the course of a product's use,
and that he should be responsible only for injuries caused by a use
244
To impose
which could have been anticipated and thus prevented.
liability for injuries caused by a use which the manufacturer had no
reason to foresee, as where a child is injured while using a power lawn
mower as a toy, 2 4 s would be to make the manufacturer an absolute

237. See W. Kimble & R. Lesher, Products Liability § 244, at 269-72 (1979).
238. See Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 CaL App. 2d 793, 50 Cal. Rptr. 143

(1966).
239. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835

(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540 P.2d 249 (1975).
240. The defendant in Bendorf had relied upon evidence of the plaintiff's misuse to defeat the element of proximate cause rather than as the basis for an affirmative defense. The
court ruled that the defendant was entitled to pursue this theory of the case. The court
found, however, that an instruction had been given which allowed the defendant to prevail
regardless of whether the plaintiff's own misuse was the proximate cause of his injuries. The
court therefore reversed and remanded without reaching the question of whether misuse is
available as an affirmative defense to strict tort liability.
241. But see Jasper v. Skyhook Corp., 89 N.M. 98, 101-02, 547 P.2d 1140, 1143-44
(Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977), in which a defense of unforeseeable misuse of a product was invoked by the defendant, with the tacit approval of the court.

242. See W. Kimble & R. Lesher, Products Liability § 244, at 269-72 (1979).
243. See Keeton, Products Liability and Defenses-Intervening Misconduct, 15 The

Forum 109, 112 (1979).
244. Helene Curtis Indus, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
245. See Wenzell v. MTD Prod., Inc., 32 Ill. App. 3d 279, 336 N.E.2d 125 (1975).
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insurer of his products, a result never intended under the doctrine of
strict liability. 2 46
Although no New Mexico court has yet declared that unforesee-

able misuse is an affirmative defense to strict tort liability in this jurisdiction, there are several reasons to conclude that this would be the
holding in any case in which the issue is presented for resolution.
First, the issue has been discussed at some length in the court of appeals concurring opinion in which the author concluded that unforeseeable misuse, but not foreseeable misuse, should be recognized as

an affirmative defense to strict tort liability.2 4' The New Mexico

courts have never disapproved this opinion. Second, an affirmative
defense of unforseeable misuse has been invoked on at least one
2
occasion in a New Mexico case without disapproval by the court. 48
Although the defense ultimately was unsuccessful based on the evi-

dence, the court gave tacit recognition to the defense's availability in
strict tort actions. Finally, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
recognize unforeseeable misuse as a valid affirmative defense. While
this fact alone is not controlling, the courts of New Mexico on several occasions have deferred to the wisdom of general rules formu-

lated by other state courts. 2 49 It therefore seems likely that unforeseeable misuse will be recognized as an affirmative defense to strict
tort liability in New Mexico. 2 s0
246. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 CaL 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978). The more probable rationale for the majority rule is that in cases involving the unforeseeable misuse of a product, the prima facie elements of defectiveness and proximate
cause are missing, and therefore it is not possible to impose strict tort liability. That a product is not defective in such cases is indicated by Comment h to Section 402A, which states
that a product is not defective when it is "safe for normal use and consumption." It is the
plaintiff's own abnormal use which has created the risk of injury rather than any condition
of the product. Similarly, it is the plaintiff's misuse, rather than a product defect, which has
proximately caused his injuries. Nevertheless, the majority of courts continue to hold that
evidence of unforeseeable misuse supports a valid affirmative defense to strict tort liability,
irrespective of the extent to which such evidence may be used to defeat the plaintiff's prima
facie case.
247. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 360-66, 540
P.2d 835, 840-46 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540 P.2d 249 (1975) (Sutin, J.,
concurring). For a more detailed discussion of the majority and concurring opinions in Ben.
dorf see Occhialino, Survey of Developments in New Mexico: ProductsLiability, 6 N.M.L.
Rev. 285 (1976). See also 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 15, § 16A[5] [f].
248. See Jasper v. Skyhook Corp., 89 N.M. 98, 547 P.2d 1140 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'd
on othergrounds, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
249. See, e.g., Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 735, 497 P.2d 732, 737 (1972),
where the court states:
We feel that the conditions and the needs of the times makes it appropriate for such changes as we are here making. Most of the states who have
adopted strict liability have done so through the judicial system. This has
been called "following the leader" and we see nothing wrong with this general principle of the leader is going in the right direction.
250. Further support for this conclusion may be found in the recently adopted Uniform
Jury Instructions for use in product liability actions. See N.M.U.J.1. Civ. 14.3 (Repl. 1980).
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The likelihood that the New Mexico courts will recognize evidence
of unforeseeable misuse as the basis for an affirmative defense does
not suggest, however, that evidence of foreseeable misuse will be
treated in the same manner. Recognition of foreseeable misuse as an
affirmative defense would violate policies underlying the strict liability of sellers in that it would excuse liability for injuries which the
seller could have anticipated and taken steps to prevent. In many
cases, recognition would permit evidence of slight plaintiff misconduct to bar all recovery, even though injury could have been avoided,
for example, by the placement of a warning on the product informing
users of the dangers of a particular use. Thus, the general principle
has evolved in other jurisdictions that foreseeable misuse of a product creates no bar to recovery in strict tort.2 5 1
all other forms of contributory negligence
It is reasonably clear that all other forms of a plaintiffs contributory negligence, in the generalized sense of simple failure to use due
care for one's own safety, cannot be relied upon as affirmative defenses. That there is any dispute over this issue at all is due to the
failure of both the Comments to Section 402A and the courts of
New Mexico to give express consideration to forms of contributory
negligence which falls between failure to discover or guard against a
product defect and assumption of risk. Examples of these intermediate forms of contributory negligence include intoxication or failure
to keep a proper lookout in traffic. The courts and individual judges
have been consistent, however, in suggesting that the only forms of
plaintiff misconduct which will give rise to an affirmative defense in
strict tort actions are assumption of risk and unforeseeable misuse.
These same courts further emphasize that "conventional" contributory negligence provides no basis for an affirmative defense in New
Mexico. 2 52 The obvious intent of the courts in the use of this phrase
has been to reject categorically an affirmative defense based upon
any type of plaintiff misconduct which does not rise to the level of
assumption of risk or unforeseeable product misuse.
b. adoption and applicationof comparative negligence principles
A recent development which may significantly affect the importance to litigants of affirmative defenses based upon a plaintiffs mis251. See W. Kimble & R. Lesher, Products Liability § 244, at 269-72 (1979).
252. See Claymore v. City of Albuquerque, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 75 (Ct. App. Jan. 15,
1981), aff'd sub nora. Scott v. Rizzo, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 289 (Mar. 12, 1981); Rudisaile v.
Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 592 P.2d 175 (1979); Strickland v. Roosevelt County
Rival Elec. Coop., 94 N.M. 459, 612 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1980); Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540
P.2d 249 (1975).
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conduct is the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence in
New Mexico. In Claymore v. City of Albuquerque,2"' a rule of
"pure" comparative negligence' s 4 was adopted for use in negligence
actions. Under this doctrine, damage liability is assessed in a manner
directly proportionate to a litigant's degree of fault; a plaintiffs failure to use due care for his own protection will not bar recovery as it
would under a system of contributory negligence, but will merely
reduce the amount of damages to which he is entitled. The question
raised by adoption of the rule in the context of a negligence action is
what effect, if any, the rule will have in strict tort actions.
While an extended discussion of the interrelationships between the
doctrines of comparative negligence and strict tort liability is beyond
the scope of this Comment, it is possible to identify and discuss
briefly three major issues which the Claymore decision raises with respect to the impact that comparative negligence principles can have
upon future strict tort actions in New Mexico. These issues are: (1)
whether comparative negligence principles are applicable in strict tort
actions; (2) if so, whether the prior distinctions between types of
plaintiff misconduct available as affirmative defenses to strict tort liability will survive the adoption of comparative negligence; and (3)
what is to be compared between the plaintiff and defendant.
applicability of comparative negligence to strict tort actions
The initial question raised by the adoption of comparative negligence principles is whether these principles will be applied in strict
tort actions. The question is important to litigants because its answer
will determine whether defendants may continue to rely on the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and unforeseeable misuse as
complete bars to recovery. 2 I
The majority of states which have addressed the issue by either
statute or judicial decree have adopted the view that comparative negligence principles are applicable to claims for strict tort liability.2 5 6
The rationale for this view essentially is three-fold. As outlined by
253. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull 75 (Ct App. Jan. 15, 1981), affd sub nom. Scott v. Rizzo, 20
N.M. St. B. Bull 289 (Mar. 12, 1981).
254. For a discussion of the different types of comparative fault systems and their relative merits, see Goldberg, Judicial Adoption of Comparative Fault in New Mexico: The
Time isat Hand, 10 N.M.L. Rev. 3, 10-12 (1979-80).
255. The court in Claymore recognized that the effect of application of comparative
negligence principles in strict tort actions will be to abolish, as total bars to recovery, affirmative defenses previously allowed to be raised in New Mexico. See 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at
79.
256. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
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the California Supreme Court in one of the leading cases on the issue,
Daly v. GeneralMotors Corp.,2 57 the first justification for extending
comparative negligence is the promotion of the "equitable allocation
of loss among all parties legally responsible in proportion to their
fault." 2 5 8 It is fundamentally fair, according to the Daly court, that
liability be shared where two parties are partly responsible for a plaintiffs injuries, even in the context of strict tort actions. Second, the
court found that extension of comparative negligence principles will
not frustrate the policy goals underlying the doctrine of strict tort
liability. Strict tort liability was imposed on sellers of defective goods
to relieve injured consumers from problems of proof, to place the
burden of loss on manufacturers rather than on victims who are
powerless to protect themselves, and to spread the cost of compensating these individuals throughout society. All of these goals would
still be realized, according to the court, because plaintiffs will continue to be relieved from the burden of proving negligence, and the
cost of compensating injured consumers, although proportionately
reduced, remains with the manufacturer and hence will be spread
among society.25 9 Finally, extension of comparative negligence principles will remedy the anomaly which exists where these principles
are applied only in negligence actions, namely, that the affirmative
defense of assumption of risk would diminish a plaintiffs recovery in
a negligence action but would wholly bar recovery in an action for
strict tort. The doctrine of strict tort liability should not afford
plaintiffs less protection than negligence theory. Strict tort liability
was created to free plaintiffs from the constraints of traditional
theories; extension of comparative negligence principles serves this
end. 2 60

The opposing view is represented by the dissenting opinion in Daly
of Justice Mosk. 2 61 Justice Mosk took issue with the majority on
several points. His primary objection, however, was that extension of
comparative negligence principles to strict tort actions introduces
notions of a plaintiff's negligence which are wholly incompatible
with the doctrine of strict tort liability. The focus under the doctrine
of strict tort liability has always been on the condition of a seller's
product and not on the conduct of the parties. To permit a seller's
damage liability to be reduced on the grounds that the consumer
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 CaL Rptr. at 386-87.
737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
757-64, 575 P.2d at 1181-86, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 399-41 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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failed to use ordinary care, rather than limiting liability only in cases
of assumption of risk, "is to dilute the defect of the article by elevating the conduct of the wounded consumer to an issue of equal significance." 2 62 For Justice Mosk, "litigation should not be diverted
to consideration of the negligence of the plaintiff."1 63
The objections to extension of comparative negligence principles
to strict tort actions thus far have failed to sway even a small minority of the courts. Every state which has both adopted comparative
negligence judicially and addressed this issue, for example, has approved of the extension.164 Whether the objections voiced by Justice
Mosk will be given a greater reception in the New Mexico courts is
unclear. The court in Claymore in dictum states that opinions from
the thirty-five other comparative negligence jurisdictions "provide
sufficient guidelines to permit our New Mexico trial courts to adapt
and apply the comparative negligence philosophy to actual controversies and specific factual circumstances, as they arise. "2 6 s It may
be argued that this statement provides the lower courts with the necessary mandate to follow the majority rule and approve the extension
of comparative negligence principles to strict tort actions in New
Mexico.
survival of prior distinctionsbetween types of plaintiff misconduct
Assuming that comparative negligence principles will be applied to
strict tort actions in New Mexico, the question arises as to whether
the distinctions previously made between types of plaintiff misconduct will continue to be followed. Will assumption of risk and unforeseen product misuse remain the only type of plaintiff misconduct
recognized as affirmative defense to strict tort liability, or will other
types of plaintiff misconduct now be available to reduce a defendant's liability?
Some courts in jurisdictions which both acknowledge a seller's
strict tort liability for defective products and adhere to a system of
comparative negligence have indicated that they will permit all types
262. Id. at 759, 575 P.2d at 1183, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
263. Id.
264. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). West Virginia also has
adopted comparative negligence judicially, but the state's courts have not yet addressed the
issue of whether comparative negligence principles will be applied to actions for strict tort
liability. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
265. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 79.
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of plaintiff's misconduct to reduce a defendant's liability. 2 66 The
rationale for this approach has never been articulated by the courts.
The approach may result from a recognition that the initial policy
basis for precluding conventional contributory negligence as an affirmative defense in strict tort actions essentially was the undesirability
of completely barring a plaintiff's claim when he may have been only
minimally at fault.2 6 1 With the abolition of a plaintiff's lack of due
care as a complete bar to recovery, this objection is eliminated.
The view that prior distinctions should be abolished following
adoption of comparative negligence has been criticized, however, on
at least two grounds. First, one commentator has objected that recognition of conventional contributory negligence as an affirmative
defense will permit the manufacturer of a defective product to reduce his liability for injuries caused by the very condition of his
product which he was under an absolute duty to prevent.2 68 If a
manufacturer can be held strictly liable at all to a negligent user for
a dangerous condition of his product, it is because the law imposes a
duty on the manufacturer to produce a product which is incapable
of harming users in the manner made possible by its dangerous condition. "To either exculpate the defendant or to permit the reduction of total damages based on the fact that plaintiff had also been
at fault," according to this commentator, "is to demean the very process in which we determined that defendant's design was substandard., 2 6 9 A second objection is that it will create a poor system of
risk distribution. 2"7 Whenever a plaintiff in a strict tort action is
made to absorb a part of the loss, it precludes the full utilization of
risk distribution by means of increasing the cost of products to reflect the total amount of injury inflicted, thereby spreading the entire loss among the public at large. It was this wide scale system of
266. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (construing
Mississippi law); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Netzel v. State
Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971); Dippelv. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443,
155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). See also Uniform Comparative Fault Act (12 U.L.A.) § 1 (Supp.
1981).
267. See Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 171,
177 (1974); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 93, 117 (1972).
268. See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault- Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 Marq. L. Rev. 297, 341-49 (1977).
269. Id. at 345.
270. See Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 171,
179 (1974).
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risk distribution which, as a policy consideration, provided initial
support for the doctrine of strict tort liability. 2 '
It is unclear at this time which approach will be adopted in New
Mexico. In its discussion of the effect of the doctrine of comparative
negligence upon strict liability claims, the court in Claymore observes
in dictum that "[p] laintiffs 'conventional' contributory negligence
has been held to be inapplicable as an affirmative defense in strict liability cases." ' 2 72 On the other hand, the court goes on to state that
"[n] evertheless, New Mexico does not equate 'strict' liability with
'absolute' liability; plaintiff's conduct is still a material although
limited, issue." '2 7 It is uncertain from these statements whether the
court intended to imply that conventional contributory negligence
will continue to be inapplicable as an affirmative defense following
the adoption of comparative negligence or whether the scope of relevant plaintiff misconduct will be expanded. The court's failure to
provide any further discussion of the issue leave these questions for
future resolution.
what will be compared
An issue which has received some discussion in other comparative
negligence jurisdictions concerns the basis for comparison in a strict
tort action in which comparative negligence principles are applied.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, a fact-finder ordinarily
is required to weigh the degree of fault or negligence of each litigant
in order to apportion damage liability. Under the doctrine of strict
tort liability, however, liability is imposed without regard to the use
of due care by a defendant. If the two doctrines are to be compatible
a working standard of comparison must be developed.
The approach favored by the courts requires the fact-finder to
compare all legal causes of a plaintiff's injuries.2 7 ' Under this approach a jury determines the extent to which the condition of a defendant's product combined with the misconduct of a plaintiff to
271. See Restatement, supra note 24, § 402A, Comment c.
272. Claymore v. City of Albuquerque, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 75, 79 (Ct. App. Jan. 15,
1981), aff'd sub nom. Scott v. Rizzo, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 289 (Mar. 12, 1981).
273. Id. Similar statements have been made by courts from other jurisdictions when recognition was being given to the fact that plaintiff misconduct in the form of unforeseeable
misuse of a product and assumption of risk are defenses to strict tort liability. See Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384
(1978). The court's statement therefore is confusing, arising as it does in the context of a
discussion of conventional forms of contributory negligence.
274. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Sun
Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho (1976).
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cause injury. The plaintiffs recovery is then limited to "that portion
of his damages equal to the percentage of the cause contributed by
the product defect." 2 7 ' In other words, his recovery is "reduced
only to the extent that his own lack of reasonable care contributed
to his injury." 2

76

As a final comment to the topic of plaintiff misconduct as the
basis for an affirmative defense, it should be noted that the probable
effect of extending comparative negligence principles to strict tort
actions will be for defendants to place greater reliance upon evidence
of plaintiff misconduct as a means of attacking the plaintiff's prima
facie case, rather than as an affirmative defense. This shift in defense
strategy will result from the fact that affirmative defenses no longer
will be a total bar to recovery as they have been in the past, while defeating any of the elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case will absolve the defendant completely from liability. Moreover, evidence of
plaintiff misconduct, particularly unforeseeable misuse of a product,
can be relevant to at least two elements of the plaintiffs prima facie
case. First, in cases involving unforeseeable misuse, it can be argued
that the product is not defective for purposes of Section 402A. Reliance would be placed upon Comment h to Section 402A which provides that "[a] product is not in a defective condition when it is safe
for normal handling and consumption." Arguing first that the product in question was safe for normal use, the defendant would then
assert that it was the plaintiff's own unforeseeable conduct which
created the risk of injury rather than any condition of the product.
Evidence of unforeseeable misuse also may be used to defeat the necessary element of proximate cause.2 7 ' Again, it is the plaintiffs own
conduct which has created the risk of injury. As long as the injury
was the result of a dangerous use which the manufacturer could not
reasonably have foreseen, the sole proximate cause of the injury is
the plaintiff's own misconduct and no recovery will lie. This ability
to defeat the plaintiffs right to recover in strict tort by relying upon
plaintiff misconduct during the presentation of the prima facie case
is certain to result in changes in defense strategy following adoption
of comparative negligence. Merely limiting liability, based upon an
affirmative defense, is never as desirable as avoiding it altogether.
275. General Motors Corp., v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977).
276. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 386 (1978) (emphasis by the court).
277. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 540 P.2d 835
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 319, 540 P.2d 249 (1975), in which the defendant relied
upon evidence of product misuse to rebut the plaintiff's evidence relating to proximate
cause, with the approval of the court.
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CONCLUSION
Recognition by the New Mexico courts of the strict tort liability
of sellers of defective goods has greatly expanded the protection
afforded consumers. The availability of this theory of products liability to the public has made the recovery of compensation for injuries
caused by a defective product much less difficult than under the
theories of negligence and warranty. There are, however, many issues
still to be resolved with respect to this new theory. There is certain
to be future litigation, for example, concerning a seller's liability to
bystanders and for economic losses, application of Section 402A to
other forms of consumer transactions not previously contemplated,
the meaning of the term "defective," and the application of the doctrine of comparative negligence to strict tort actions. It also is certain
that resolution of these issues will be guided by the same public policies which prompted the initial adoption of the doctrine of strict
tort, namely, that consumers should be provided maximum protection from product-induced injuries, and that liability should be imposed on those primarily responsible for making a harmful product
available to the public. Consequently, it may be expected that the
courts will continue to expand upon the doctrine of strict tort liability and provide even greater protection to the consuming public.
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